




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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE NAVY:  
IS PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT THE NAVY WAY?

by

Russell E. Tate

and

Michael E. Aston

December 1982

Thesis Advisor:

Reuben Harris

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Organizational Effectiveness in the Navy:  
Is Participative Management the Navy Way?

by

Russell E. Tate  
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy  
B.S., Northern Arizona University, 1971

and


Michael E. Aston  
Captain, United States Army  
B.A., Idaho State University, 1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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December 1982



### ABSTRACT

This research study presents a comparative analysis of how a sample representing ten different paygrades of U.S. Navy personnel view organizational effectiveness. The ten groups that were surveyed and interviewed include enlisted personnel E-5 through E-9, and officer personnel O-2 through O-6. They came primarily from East Coast Surface, Aviation and Submarine commands. The instrument used to collect the data was a modified version of the Navy's Human Resource Management Survey (1977 Fleet version). The modifications allowed sample personnel to associate organizational processes and managerial styles with organizational effectiveness using Likert's four 'Systems of Management'. Comparative analyses were made on the basis of rank, length of time in service, prior attendance at the Navy's Leadership Management Education and Training course, primary location of Navy service, and type of warfare community. Interviews were used to provide both a contextual framework for and a greater understanding of the survey responses.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	10
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW .....	14
	A. INTRODUCTION .....	14
	B. DEFINITION OF OD .....	15
	C. ORGANIZATION UNIVERSALS .....	17
	D. REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT THEORIES .....	18
	1. Contingency Theories .....	18
	2. Normative Theories .....	26
	E. SUMMARY .....	29
III.	BACKGROUND ..,.....	32
	A. HISTORY OF OD IN THE NAVY .....	32
	B. THE HRM CYCLE .....	45
	C. SURVEY GUIDED DEVELOPMENT, SYSTEM FOUR AND THE U.S. NAVY .....	47
	D. THE IMPACT OF SURVEY GUIDED DEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVY .....	51
	E. SUMMARY .....	54
IV.	METHODOLOGY .....	55
	A. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS .....	55
	B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS .....	56
	C. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS .....	59
	D. SURVEY ANALYSIS PLAN .....	62



V.	ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS .....	64
A.	SURVEY RETURN .....	64
B.	GROUP MEAN DATA .....	71
1.	Overall Sample Results .....	74
2.	Mean Scores by Rank .....	75
3.	Mean Scores by Time in Service .....	76
4.	Mean Scores by LMET .....	77
5.	Mean Scores by Area .....	78
6.	Mean Scores by TYCOM .....	78
C.	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY RANK .....	80
1.	Junior Enlisted Versus Senior Enlisted ....	81
2.	Junior Enlisted Versus Junior Officer ....	83
3.	Junior Enlisted Versus Senior Officer ....	88
4.	Senior Enlisted Versus Junior Officer ....	92
5.	Senior Enlisted Versus Senior Officer ....	96
6.	Junior Officer Versus Senior Officer .....	97
D.	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY TIME IN SERVICE .....	98
1.	First Termers Versus Midgraders .....	98
2.	First Termers Versus Careerists .....	100
3.	First Termers Versus Careerists Plus .....	101
4.	Midgraders Versus Careerists .....	103
5.	Midgraders Versus Careerists Plus .....	103
6.	Careerists Versus Careerists Plus .....	104
E.	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY LMET .....	104



F.	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY AREA .....	106
G.	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY TYCOM .....	107
1.	Surface Versus Aviation .....	107
2.	Surface Versus Other (Subsurface) .....	109
3.	Aviation Versus Other (Subsurface) .....	109
H.	SUMMARY OF GROUP MEAN DATA .....	110
I.	INTERVIEW RESULTS .....	112
1.	Morale and Welfare .....	114
2.	Work Group Functioning and Supervision ....	115
3.	Order and Discipline .....	116
4.	Lower Level Influence .....	117
5.	HRM Success .....	118
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	122
A.	CONCLUSIONS .....	122
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	127
APPENDIX A:	SURVEY .....	130
APPENDIX B:	QUESTION SELECTION CRITERIA .....	134
APPENDIX C:	INTERVIEW QUESTIONS .....	139
APPENDIX D:	DATA CODE BOOK .....	142
LIST OF REFERENCES	.....	146
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	.....	150



## LIST OF FIGURES

5.1	Distribution by Rank .....	67
5.2	Distribution of Rank in the Jet Trng Sqdn .....	68
5.3	Distribution by Sex .....	68
5.4	Distribution by Time in Service (TIS) .....	69
5.5	Distribution by Area .....	70
5.6	Distribution by Type of Command (TYCOM) .....	70
5.7	Distribution by Attendance at LMET .....	71
5.8	Distribution of Non-attenders at LMET by Rank ....	72
5.9	Index by Rank Subgroup Scores Using Likert's Dimensions .....	111



## LIST OF TABLES

I.	Survey Distribution and Return Rate by Command .....	65
II.	Return Rates and Sample Means by Command .....	66
III.	Table of Means by Respondent Subgroup .....	73
IV.	Index by Rank Subgroup Score .....	82
V.	Index by Time in Service Subgroup Score .....	99
VI.	Index by LMET and Area .....	105
VII.	Index by Type of Community .....	108
VIII.	Interviews by Rank and Station .....	112
IX.	HRM Success Scores by Rank Subgroups .....	118



## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceptions of Navy personnel as to what an effective Navy organization should look like. The authors are continuing a project started in 1981 directed at assisting in determining where the Navy's Human Resource Management Program should be headed in the future. We are continuing the work presented in a thesis by Mark Gettys and Arthur Maxwell [Ref. 1] which compared perceptions of Army and Navy officers as to what an effective military organization should look like.

The research questions we are addressing are, "What are the perceptions of experienced fleet personnel of what an effective Naval organization should look like?" and "Are these perceptions consistent with participative management?"

The Navy's HRM survey is grounded in the theories and research that were developed over time in private industry. The HRM survey presently being used by the Navy was developed from the Survey of Organizations which is based on Rensis Likert's systems of management, discussed later in this paper. Likert theorized that organizations would be most effective when they used a participative-group (System Four) style of management.



Is participative management really the style of management the Navy espouses or desires? Given constraints established by the military culture such as the high value placed on the integrity of the chain of command, emphasis on communications, command and control, and the carrying of rank on the shoulder, is participative management the best path in seeking organizational effectiveness? Or, would a different style of management such as Likert's 'System Three' (consultative management) be a more accurate means of achieving and measuring military organizational effectiveness?

The purpose, then, of this study is to: (1) examine the perceptions of experienced personnel to determine what an effective Naval organization should look like; (2) suggest an alternative to the current method of assessing the effectiveness of Naval organizations; and (3) to provide a preliminary assessment of whether there is a perceived relationship between organizational effectiveness and styles of management in the Navy.

Another relevant issue that will be addressed in this study is the respondents' perceptions of the levels of past success, present success, and the potential for success in the future for the HRM program. It was interesting to note that respondents in the Gettys-Maxwell study estimated future potential for the Navy's HRM program success lower on the



average than present program satisfaction. Why would they view the future potential for success as lower than the present level of success? Is this an indication that they perceived less importance being placed on the HRM program? Is it an indication that HRM personnel need to do a better job of selling their program? Or, possibly, are there no longer any significant organizational problems in the Navy? Through the use of interviews, we hope to be able to get a better understanding of why respondents answered the way they did.

We will also compare the perceptions of enlisted personnel to those of officer personnel. This will help us determine if there are any significant differences in the perceptions of the two groups in reference to organizational effectiveness and the style of management needed in the Navy.

We will also make comparisons between surface line and aviation personnel and personnel assigned to west coast commands versus east coast commands to see if there are any significant differences in the perceptions of these groups. A comparison will also be made between those who have attended LMET and those who have not.

Chapter Two will review briefly some of the relevant management and leadership theories that have been developed. Chapter Three will then review the background and history that has led the HRM program to the point that it is at at



the present. Chapter Four will present the hypothesis and methodology of this study. Chapter Five will discuss the analysis and results of the data. Finally, Chapter Six will present the conclusions and recommendations of the study.



## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of history man has tried to deduce how organizations might best be structured and how they could best function to create the order and stability necessary for the preservation of the organization. The trend has been to develop a description of the "best" form of organization, as illustrated clearly by Weber's early work on the theory of bureaucracy. Following this work, many other administrators, theorists, executives and scholars developed models, schemes, principles and systems for the structure and functioning of organizations, always aimed at describing how to operate an effective and lasting system.

Some of the early theorists, such as Taylor, Gulick and Urwick developed tightly defined, almost rigid, sets of principles which supposedly created well-defined and structured organizations. The shift to an emphasis on the human side of organizations appeared as early as Mary Parker Follett's "The Giving of Orders" in 1925 and broadened considerably in the 1930's and 1940's with investigators such as Roethlisberger and Dickson and executives such as Barnard. More recently, a new focus of concern has been explored by theorists and investigators such as Likert, Blake and Mouton,



Hersey and Blanchard, Tannenbaum and Schmidt, Fiedler, and House. This focus is in the field of organizational change or organizational development (OD).

This new field represents a trend toward change, innovation, challenge, and development of organizational functioning as compared to earlier concern for stability and certainty. This shift in emphasis is not surprising given the incredible rate of change that society has experienced over the past hundred years and the continuous increase in this rate of change.

## B. DEFINITION OF OD

Before we consider these aforementioned theories, we want to review briefly just what is meant by OD. Frohman and Sashkin provide the following definition:

Operationally, organizational development is a planned effort to improve the functioning and effectiveness of an entire system through applications of behavioral science knowledge to the processes and structures of the system [Ref. 2].

This definition has several important elements to consider. First of all, the change effort must be related to the total organization. It may affect such areas as skills, attitudes and knowledge but its primary emphasis will be on factors such as leadership, group processes, roles, and inter-group relations.

The second important element refers to the goal of OD, that of improving the organizational functioning and



effectiveness. Organizational effectiveness can include such criteria as the organization's ability to adapt to both external and internal demands; the processes by which goals are defined, the degree to which they are shared, and the success of the system in attaining goals; the integration of individuals and groups into the organization and the communication process supporting such integration; and the climate of the system in terms of the degree of support and freedom provided to its members [Ref. 3].

The third element of the definition is that OD works on the "processes and structures of the system". Processes are the dynamic, on-going social and psychological factors by means of which the organization actually functions. Structures are a framework or configuration of the organization's members relative to one another. Chain of command, authority, and hierarchy are examples of structural factors.

Finally, OD is a planned effort. It is a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the development of a strategic plan for improvement, and the mobilization of the necessary resources to carry out the change. This effort must be managed from the top, with top management actively participating in the effort, and with both a knowledge of and a commitment to the goals of the change effort [Ref. 4].



### C. ORGANIZATION UNIVERSALS

Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton discuss several characteristics that seem to them to be universal to all organizations. Effective management of these universals is the condition of efficient production through sound organizations [Ref. 5].

The first universal is purpose. Identifying the purpose of the organization is not always an easy task. However, those searchers who have tried to identify organizations that do not have a purpose have not been successful. No matter the type of organization, educational, governmental, military, religious, family or industrial, all have a purpose. Unfortunately, however, all too frequently the purpose for which the organization exists is not the same (and may be contradictory) to the purpose people experience as a basis for joining or remaining in the organization.

Another universal is people. All organizations have them and organization purpose cannot be accomplished without them. Needing more than one person to achieve a result such as production of a thing or providing a service is what leads to the condition of organization.

The third universal is hierarchy. The process of achieving organization purpose (the first universal) through the efforts of several people (the second universal) results in some people attaining authority to supervise others; that



is to exercise responsibility for planning, controlling, and directing the activities of others through hierarchical arrangement (the third universal) [Ref. 6]. Some people are bossed and some are bosses. The foundation for understanding management is in recognizing that the boss's actions are based on his/her assumptions of how supervision should be exercised [Ref. 7]. By necessity, organizations are hierarchical and no matter how it is used, hierarchy is seen as an essential condition of organization.

As mentioned earlier, the emphasis placed on the chain of command, the wearing of rank on the shoulder and the idea of communications, command and control in the military, describe the hierarchical conditions so strongly set in the military culture.

In the next section, we will review some of the theories that have been presented as organizational development methods to help organizations achieve their purpose effectively through people by bosses.

#### D. REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT THEORIES

##### 1. Contingency Theories

As early as 1925, theories were being presented that espoused some form of participative management. In her paper "The Giving of Orders", Mary Parker Follett summarizes

"...Integration being the basic law of life, orders should be the composite conclusion of those who give them and those who receive them; more than this, that they should be



the integration of the people concerned and the situation; more even than this, that they should be the integrations involved in the evolving situation" [Ref. 8].

Parker's early ideas on how orders should be given, that is, that they should be the composite conclusion of both the giver and the receiver and that they should be an integration of the people and the situation, is probably the first precursor of the more recently coined term of participative management.

The wish to govern one's own life is one of the most fundamental feelings in every human being. To consider people's feelings and to allow them to have some say in the decisions that affect them helps to fulfill this wish to govern their own lives. Orders that are given only after both supervisor and subordinate have agreed that that is the best thing to do, become symbols, symbols of the authority of the order giver and the responsibility that accompanies that authority. According to Follett, orders should seek to unite or integrate dissociated paths and the internal conflicts of individuals or groups.

Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt presented their "Continuum of Leadership Behavior" in 1958. The continuum presents a range of possible leadership behaviors available to a manager. The extremes of the continuum are "boss-centered leadership" which is characterized by a high degree of control versus the "subordinate-centered



leadership" characterized by a high degree of subordinate freedom. Using this continuum as a guide, the manager considers three important factors or forces in deciding how to manage.

(1) Forces in the manager. Among the important internal forces affecting the manager will be his value system, his confidence in his subordinates, his own leadership inclinations and his feelings of security in an uncertain situation. If the manager understands that these forces influence his behaviors either consciously or unconsciously, he can often make himself or herself more effective.

(2) Forces in the subordinate. Some of the forces that need to be considered in the subordinate are the degree of need for independence, the degree of readiness to assume decision making responsibility, the degree of tolerance for ambiguity, and the degree of understanding and accepting of organizational goals. The manager will generally find that a greater degree of freedom is allowed as the sum of these forces rises within his subordinates.

(3) Forces in the situation. Certain characteristics of the general situation will also affect the manager's behavior. Among the more critical environmental pressures that surround him are those which stem from the type of organization, work group effectiveness, the nature of the problem and the pressures of time [Ref. 9].

The successful leader then is one who is aware of these forces. He understands himself, the individuals in the group he's dealing with and the organization and environment in which he operates. More than this, he is one who is able to assess the forces that should determine his behavior at any given time. When direction is called for, he can direct and when considerable participative freedom is called for, he can allow such freedom.



The continuum of leadership behavior, then, is situational, providing an excellent overview of numerous factors that are relevant to effective leadership. Rather than espousing a "one best way" of managing, it assists the manager in determining the most appropriate style of leadership in a given situation.

Another contingency approach to leadership is Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard's "life cycle theory". From this perspective, the leadership style that would be most effective varies with the maturity of subordinates. Here, maturity is defined as the desire for achievement, willingness to accept responsibility, and task-related ability and experience.

Hersey and Blanchard believe that the relationship between a manager and his subordinates moves through four phases as the subordinates develop and "mature", and that managers need to vary their leadership style with each phase. In the initial phase, as subordinates first enter the organization, for example, a high task orientation by the manager is most appropriate because maturity is low. Subordinates have to be instructed in their tasks and familiarized with the organization's rules and procedures. A non-directive manager at this point would only cause anxiety and confusion among new employees.



As subordinates begin to learn their tasks, a task orientation by the manager remains necessary but begins to decrease. The manager will start to use an employee-oriented leadership style as subordinates become more and more familiar with the organizational rules and procedures.

As they move into the third phase, the subordinates' ability and achievement motivation have increased and they actively seek greater responsibility. The manager will no longer need to be as directive but will continue to be supportive and considerate in order to strengthen the subordinates' resolve for greater responsibility.

In the last phase, the subordinates gradually become confident, self-directing, and experienced and the manager reduces the amount of support and encouragement provided. Here, both task and relationship behaviors are low. The subordinates are on their own and no longer need or expect a close relationship with their manager.

This theory suggests that participation becomes more effective as the task-related maturity of the subordinate increases. The lower the task-related maturity, the more effective an authoritarian style of leadership would be. Use of the appropriate style will not only motivate subordinates but will also help move them toward "maturity". As the subordinates develop, the manager will constantly be shifting his/her leadership style.



The contingency model of leadership was one of the earliest and most articulated of the leadership theories. According to this model developed by Fred E. Fiedler, the effectiveness of a group depends on the interaction between the leader and the situation. This requires matching the leader's motivational structure as indicated by the goals given the highest priority with the degree to which the situation is favorable or unfavorable to the leader.

The leader may be task motivated or relationship motivated. Leader motivation is measured by the least preferred co-worker (LPC) scale which asks the individual to describe, on the measuring scale, the one person, of all the people with whom he or she has ever worked, with whom he or she could work least well. An individual who described his or her LPC in negative and rejecting terms is a low-LPC or task-motivated person. Someone who described his or her LPC in relatively positive terms is a high-LPC or relationship-motivated person.

Fiedler's model presents three component dimensions that affect the degree to which the situation provides the leader with potential power and authority. These are leader-member relations, task structure, and position power. The leadership implications of the model are that

- (1) Relationship-motivated (high-LPC) leaders generally perform best in situations in which their relations with subordinates are good but task structure and position power



are low or when relationships with subordinates are poor but task and position power are high.

(2) Task-motivated leaders (low-LPC) perform best when all three situational factors that define their control and influence are either high or low.

Fiedler's Theory is that group effectiveness can be improved by either changing the leader's motivational structure (basic goals) or by modifying the leadership situation. Because it is difficult to change the motivation structure, which is a part of the personality of the leader, Fiedler prefers the modifying of the situation and believes it is relatively easy to accomplish by selecting certain leaders for certain tasks, giving less responsibility to certain leaders, or by providing leadership training to increase the leader's power and influence. This amounts to engineering the work situation or the job to fit the manager [Ref. 10].

The last contingency theory of leadership that we will consider is the "path-goal" theory presented by Robert J. House. Here, the leader's function is seen as a supplemental one. The leader provides subordinates with coaching, guidance and rewards that are necessary for effective performance. Also, the impact of the leader's behavior is determined by the situation in which the leader is operating and by dealing with the situation appropriately. Two contingency variables that the leader must consider are the characteristics of the subordinate and the environmental pressures and demands with which subordinates must cope in



order to accomplish the work goals and to satisfy their own needs.

With respect to the first class of contingency factors, the characteristics of subordinates, path-goal theory asserts that leader behavior will be acceptable to subordinates to the extent that they see such behavior as either an immediate source of satisfaction or instrumental to future satisfaction; subordinates with high affiliation needs would see a considerate leader as a source of satisfaction. Those with high achievement needs would likely see initiating structure or behavior that facilitates task accomplishment as a source of satisfaction.

The characteristics of the environment of the subordinate or task demands, with which the subordinate must cope, also determine effective leader behavior. Unstructured, nonroutine tasks can be effectively handled if the leader initiates structure. However, if the work methods are of a routine nature, the initiation of additional structure or close supervision would be perceived as unnecessary. Also, for unsatisfying tasks, consideration is of great importance.

The idea that effective leadership behavior is contingent on worker and task characteristics has been generally supported by research [Ref. 11]. It not only suggests what type of style may be most effective in a given



situation, but it also attempts to explain why it is most effective. However, House cautions that because path-goal theory is relatively new to the literature of organizational behavior, it is offered more as a tool for directing research and stimulating insight than as a proven guide for managerial action [Ref. 12].

## 2. Normative Theories

In their thesis, Gettys and Maxwell discussed Rensis Likert's Four Systems of Management and James Price's Organizational Effectiveness Theories in great detail. As in the previous section we will discuss only briefly the normative leadership models of Rensis Likert and Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton.

The four management systems described by Likert are (1) exploitive authoritarian, (2) benevolent authoritative, (3) consultative, and (4) participative group [Ref. 13]. The four management systems are based on differing attitudes of trust and confidence in subordinates. For example, System One is characterized by a lack of confidence and trust in people, use of fear and punishment, little interaction between superiors and subordinates, and centralized decision making at the top. System Four, participative group, on the other hand, is the opposite extreme, characterized by trust, confidence, participation, extensive interaction, and so on. Between Systems One and Four are varying degrees of these



characteristics. These patterns of behavior in utilizing human resources can be determined by a questionnaire developed by Likert to gather and measure information on the following operating characteristics of an organization: leadership, motivation, communication, decision making, interaction and influence, goal setting, and the control process used by the organization.

Likert's theory is both descriptive and normative. He believes that the closer the management style of the organization approaches System Four, (System Four being optimum) the more likely it is to be a highly productive organization with high employee satisfaction.

Another normative model is the Managerial Grid developed by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton. It is based on the concept that there are two key variables found in organizations, concern for "production" and concern for "people", and identifies possible combinations of these two variables.

The horizontal axis of the grid indicates concern for production while the vertical axis indicates concern for people. Each is expressed as a nine-point scale of concern, one showing minimum concern and nine showing maximum concern [Ref. 14].

At the lower left corner of the grid is the 1,1 style. This style has a minimum of both concerns, often



referred to as "impoverished management" or the do-nothing manager. In the upper left corner is found the 1,9 style. Here there is a minimum concern for production and maximum concern for people. This style is often labeled "country club management". In the lower right corner is the 9,1 style. This style has a maximum concern for production and a minimum concern for human aspects. This is the "production pusher" or authority-obedience manager. In the upper right corner is the 9,9 style or "team management". Here there is a maximum concern for both people and production. In the center of the grid is the 5,5 style, the "organization man" or the middle-of-the-road manager. This style has an intermediate amount of concern for people and production [Ref. 15].

Blake and Mouton are of the opinion that the 9,9 team builder is the most effective management style. True 9,9 conditions exist when individual goals are in line with those of the organization. Commitment comes from having a stake in the outcome of interdependent effort. Under these circumstances, the needs of individuals to be engaged in meaningful interdependent effort mesh with the organization requirements for excellent performance. Research by Blake and Mouton shows that the 9,9 style is the one most positively associated with productivity and profitability,



career success and satisfaction, and physical and mental health [Ref. 16].

#### E. SUMMARY

In summary, the situational theories presented here, the leadership continuum, the life cycle theory, the contingency model, and the path-goal theory, all suggest that leadership must be dynamic and flexible rather than static. Each model requires that a set of factors such as ability and experience of subordinates, the situation, the leader's personality, etc., must constantly be assessed in order to determine which style of leadership would be most appropriate. In other words, the leader must be sensitive to himself or herself, the workgroup and the situation.

Individuals in their roles as leaders will differ in their ability to vary their leadership behavior or style. Some may be limited to a single leadership style; others may be quite flexible. Even the leadership situation itself will make different demands on adaptability. Some situations are stable and predictable, whereas other leadership situations are dynamic and unpredictable. This will require careful consideration in the selection, placement, training and development of leaders and subordinates throughout the organization.

As is true with the contingency theories, the normative models of Likert and Blake and Mouton are generally supported



by research [Ref. 17, 18]. However, most of this research has been done in the private and government sector with little research in the purely military community. Given the differences that exist between civilian culture and military culture such as the emphasis on the integrity of the chain of command, wearing of rank on the shoulder, and the emphasis on communications, command and control, we question the validity and applicability of this research to the Navy in its attempt to determine which model would be the best to use. We agree that the factors presented in these normative models are important aspects to consider when trying to find an ideal style of management for the Navy. However, we question whether any one theory can provide a "best way" to follow.

The theoretical basis for much of the activity in the Navy's Human Resource Management (HRM) program stems from a group of assumptions about the nature of efficient organizational systems, the characteristics of such systems, and the method by which these characteristics can be measured and enhanced. The objective of the HRM program could be argued as the attainment of a "System Four" status by the Navy and each of its constituent organizations by means of "survey guided development" using the "Survey of Organizations" which was developed from research in and for non-military organizations.



In the next chapter, we will review the background of the Navy's (HRM) birth and how it grew to what it is today. We will also explore how participative management became the basis of the HRM effort.



### III. BACKGROUND

#### A. HISTORY OF OD IN THE NAVY

In his book, New Patterns of Management, Rensis Likert states,

"The validity of the newer theory of management and of its derivations can be tested in two ways. Tests can be applied experimentally in pilot plants to see whether the newer system significantly improves all aspects of performance: productivity, quality, costs, employee satisfaction, etc...The second kind of test is an examination of the extent to which the methods and procedures called for by the theory are associated with above average performance in the current operations of companies...results indicate...that the newer theory, skillfully used, will produce an organization with impressive performance characteristics" [Ref. 19].

The following quote was taken from a report contracted for by the Department of the Navy in 1980 to Booz, Allen and Hamilton consultants, on the organization and functioning of the Navy's Human Resource Management system.

"Based on research to date and the perceptions of the field staff, there is a general sense that HRM is a program of value to the Navy, a program that has done 'some good' in improving human resource management. At the same time, however, the research is not conclusive and does not demonstrate actual impact and (sic) the barriers to achieving impact are substantial. As a result, even the individuals responsible for the HRM program at all levels seem to feel the potential for significant program impact has not been fully realized. Clearly there are substantial obstacles to both achieving an impact as well as measuring what has occurred" [Ref. 20].

These two quotes represent both the promise that the theory underlying the Navy's Human Management Resource (HRM) program has held for improved management of its personnel and



the difficulties that the sponsors of the program have faced in applying that theory in pragmatic terms to the United States Navy.

The HRM program in the Navy is now fully institutionalized, by directive, as a normally scheduled segment of each command's regular operating cycle. OPNAV 5300.6B, states in part:

"1. All commands shall:

a. Be scheduled for the HRM survey, a five day (consecutive) dedicated HRAV period and a six to twelve month follow-up visit, consistent with the capability of existing HRMC/D resources.

b. Arrange with the assigned HRMC/D for feedback of survey results and determine objectives for the assigned HRAV period consistent with the HRM system goals." [Ref. 21]

This chapter will outline why and by what process the Navy consciously has altered its prescribed approach to leadership and management away from a tradition of 'benevolent autocratism' toward 'participative group' practices. It will highlight some of the main events and people who contributed to this process, and it will conclude with some assessments of this effort's impact on the Navy.

In tracing out the circumstances that led the Navy from traditional leadership and management practices (what seasoned veterans refer to as 'Rocks and Shoals') to the present approach which blends behavioral science, the computer, and institutionalized management consulting,



several names and events are readily identifiable as having had an impact on shaping relevant events. These factors will be mentioned briefly, and then considered in detail in a more chronological order.

Rensis Likert, of the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan, is credited with the theoretical base upon which the organizational effectiveness and management practices section of the Navy's HRM survey is based. His two most famous books, New Patterns of Management, and The Human Organization, actively promoted a normative style of leadership and management based on work group participative management practices which he labeled System Four management.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, provided the direction to guide the Navy toward programs to deal effectively with the real problems that Navy personnel face, and the force to overcome the roadblocks and dilutions that threatened his people programs in their infancy.

The period of social unrest beginning during the second half of the 1960's was especially intense at the end of the decade and the beginning of the 1970's. The Navy, as a microcosm, was in an especially vulnerable position. Not only was the Navy catching its (no doubt deserved) share of racial backlash after many years of repression of minorities



but the influx of new personnel recruited to help fight a very unpopular conflict in Vietnam brought the views of liberal, well-educated and minority sailors into head-on conflict with their Navy superiors.

The spectre of the end of the draft forced top Naval leaders to deal with the reality of competing with the civilian job market for new, better educated personnel to fill the ever more technical roles modern warfare created.

The convergence of these significant factors occurred about the same time as Admiral Zumwalt took command of the Navy and were significant throughout his tour as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Some of the long-standing problems that the admiral inherited as he assumed "his watch" were problems without any simple solutions. The problems of racism, poor leadership and alcohol abuse were among the most pressing he faced initially. From Zumwalt's book, On Watch, he is seen to be an early advocate of reform who voiced loud concern over the eventual effects of the Navy's stagnated views of authority, egalitarianism and racism. In 1964, as Executive Assistant to then Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, Admiral Zumwalt remarked that, "my sense of urgency about personnel reform led me to seek urgently for mechanisms that would permit that reform to occur faster than the normal pace of (Navy) bureaucracy permitted. In 1964 we (at SECNAV staff level) set up a Personnel Retention Task Force. It produced



a set of dramatic recommendations along precisely the lines of the ones I was planning to initiate as CNO" [Ref. 22].

Admiral Zumwalt identified several things the Navy could do to make the service more attractive and satisfying. The first was "to find ways to give bright and talented young men and women more responsibility and greater opportunity for advancement than they were getting, to increase 'job satisfaction'." Another, and to him more important, "was to throw overboard, once and for all, the Navy's silent but real and persistent discrimination against minorities..." [Ref. 23].

These personally held attitudes and values the admiral espoused are the factors he credits for his being selected as the CNO over the heads of many officers much more senior to him.

The Department of Defense, under like-minded James Schlesinger, issued its Human Goals Credo in mid-1969. In addition to its intended purpose as serving as a model for the individual services to strive towards in personnel matters, it tended to head off any ambiguity concerning the official policy position of the Department of Defense in regards to their stance on minority and racial issues.

The war in Vietnam was as much a battlefield between the traditions and customs of the career military personnel and the more liberal ideologies of the recruit as it was between



East and West. As the Commander for the U.S. Navy Coastal Forces in Vietnam, Admiral Zumwalt had numerous opportunities to witness firsthand the kind of 'rules and regulations' battles the younger officers and enlisted personnel fought in addition to fighting the enemy. It was during this period that long held ideas on effective leadership and personnel management were in his mind fully confirmed. He only required the opportunity to institute them. That opportunity came in the summer of 1970, when he was picked to be CNO.

The rules and regulations that were earmarked for excision by the Admiral and the early retention study groups he convened resulted in many of the OPNAV directives known throughout the fleet as 'Z-grams'. These NAVOPS often took the form of guidance, suggestions, recommendations and were not infrequently highly directive in nature. In Navy parlance this practice is known as 'giving rudder orders', and many unit commanders bridled, at least initially, under the perceived close supervision of the top man.

On November 4, 1970, the CNO issued NAVOP Z-55 which states in part:

"My deep belief that the Navy's greatest resource lies in our Human Assets has been previously stated and is the backbone of my efforts in the personnel area to date. Feedback from recent field trips, two retention study groups, and many other sources indicated the desirability of adapting some of the behavioral sciences to the effective management of these vital assets. To this end, I have directed the establishment of a pilot program, involving approximately 24 selected personnel, who will



develop and evaluate new techniques in the Human Relations area. My objective is to improve the management of our Human Resources by enhancing our understanding of and communications with people" [Ref. 24].

Of the 1200 plus applicants that responded to this message, 13 officers and 11 enlisted personnel were selected in December, 1970. In January, 1971, they reported to the Naval Chaplain School in Newport, Rhode Island, to establish the Human Resources Management Pilot Program, and begin eight weeks of training. After completing training, they began searching out existing and projected ideas. They were presented strategies by some of the foremost behavioral scientists in the private sector. After deliberation, Organizational Development was selected as the most promising strategy.

The pilot group found four individual methods of Organizational Development of possible use to meet the CNO's requirements. They were:

- (1) The Instrumented Survey-Feedback method developed by Bowers and Franklin at the Institute for Social Research.
- (2) The Team Development method of Douglas McGregor and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- (3) The Grid Management Organizational Development System of Doctors Blake and Mouton.
- (4) The Laboratory Learning Method as developed by Schein and Bennis.

In April, 1971, the Pilot Program began to develop its own organizational structure and define its own mission. Concurrently in the Navy Department in Washington, the Human



Relations Development Project Office (HRDPO) was established within the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), to exercise oversight over some of the proliferation of people-related programs that were being established within the Navy. By September, 1971, a structure for the Pilot Program had been created, and a mission of implementing OD in the Navy had been defined.

December, 1971, brought the initial design of a specific Organizational Development program tailored for use by the Navy. It was a sequence of seven steps or processes all under the heading of 'Command Development'. This program was accompanied by a government publication entitled The Navy N: Integration of Men and Mission. The seven steps of command Development were:

Step 1. "Introductory Experience" - A one week introductory seminar for a cross-sectional representation of the command.

Step 2. "Information Gathering" - Gathering data on the Organizational Climate through the use of interviews, surveys or both methods.

Step 3. "Information Analysis" - Data analysis through the use of computer and manual means.

Step 4. "Analysis Display and Feedback" - Data feedback to the unit's commanding officer.

Step 5. "Analysis and Interpretation" - Data interpretation by the command's consultant team.

Step 6. "Action Program" - Development of the Action Program coming from data interpretation and feedback.



Step 7. "Evaluation Program" - Assessment of the overall development effort.

Initial testing and evaluation of the steps of the Command Development program began on a voluntary basis on units of Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO in Newport, Rhode Island, from January through May, 1972.

In March, 1972, while this field testing of Command Development was proceeding, the HRM Pilot Program was terminated, and utilizing a core group of the original 24 members, the HRM program was given command status as the Human Resources Development Center (HRMC) Naval Station, Newport, Rhode Island. Three other HRDC's were also established during the summer and fall months of 1972. They were established at Norfolk, San Diego and Pearl Harbor utilizing other members of the original 24 in the pilot program, plus another 100 officers and enlisted men. A civilian consulting firm trained these early consultants until their level of expertise and experience was such that the Centers could do their own training.

In May, 1972, a more complete field testing effort of Command Development was begun by HRDC Newport using six ships and staffs of Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla TWO (CRUDESFLOT TWO), which lasted until the close of 1972. The evaluation report of the test of the Command Development cycle, written by the Operational Commander, while generally favorable to



the program, was critical of its length, rigidity, and extensive time demands upon the units involved [Ref. 25].

During these same closing months of 1972, October and November, race riots occurred aboard U.S.S. Hassayampa, U.S.S. Kittyhawk, and U.S.S. Constellation. These events focused attention throughout the military and government on Admiral Zumwalt's 'people programs'. Some (particularly senior career and retired) Navy personnel had only been waiting for an opportunity such as this breach of the traditionally unquestioned authority of rank and seniority to call for Zumwalt's immediate ouster. In On Watch, the Admiral states that then National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had made arrangements to have Zumwalt sacked immediately, but that he was overridden only on the order of the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, who shared Zumwalt's belief in the 'people programs' [Ref. 26].

The CNO's immediate concern in addition to the negative publicity the rioting might have on the Navy was that much of the progress and any credibility that had grown around his programs for people would be irrevocably lost if perceived as being negatively associated with a general trend toward 'permissiveness' in the Navy. The upshot of this was the establishment of a 20-hour, 3-4 days seminar for all Navy personnel entitled "Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity" (UPWARD). Although this seminar was laudable in its



goals, its approach was to raise the level of awareness on issues of racial discrimination by challenging the attitudes and personal values of the attendees. It was felt that the discrimination problem was so interwoven with the fabric of the Navy that only by open challenge to the behaviors and attitudes of Navy men and women would they see the discriminatory practices for what they were. That the UPWARD seminars were inflammatory undoubtedly understates the case by several orders of magnitude. "...many Navy people to this day take a jaundiced view of a program designed to undermine good order and discipline" [Ref. 27]. UPWARD seminars became an appendage to a broader endeavor called PHASE I of Equal Opportunity in the Navy. This was an attempt to point out the general direction the Navy needed to go in to help itself on the road to recovery in the areas of discrimination and minority opportunity.

PHASE II of the Equal Opportunity effort which followed, employed many of the same techniques and instruments later used in the HRM cycle. It emphasized command responsibility more than individual attitudes. The current trend toward acceptance of the HRM programs and the recent surge of voluntary unit participation is testimony to the effort that Navy practitioners have made in overcoming the negative attitude toward the entire HRM system that was, unfortunately, the legacy of some of these earlier efforts.



In January, 1973, a Human Relations Management Team was established in Washington, D.C., to work with all Naval shore activities in the HRM area.

In March, 1973, the Human Goals Office was established within the Navy Department with the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Human Goals as Pers-P and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Human Goals as OP-01P. Under the guidance of RADM Charles Rauch, Pers-P, the Human Goals office began consolidating the Navy's programs in Equal Opportunity, Race Relations, Organizational Development, Drugs and Alcohol, Career Counselling and Intercultural Relations into one comprehensive package.

The Human Goals Plan, OPNAV 5300.6 series, was first promulgated in August, 1973. The objectives as originally stated in OPNAV 5300.6 were:

- To insure that the personnel of the Navy at every level of command are informed of and understand the Human Goals Credo and its importance as a basic tenet of Navy life.

- To implement leadership and management improvement programs at every level in the chain of command to achieve increased command excellence through the most effective utilization of human and physical resources.

- To ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and eliminate individual and institutional racism.

- To reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and in giving strength to the chain of command.

- To ensure that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument of overseas diplomacy and that individual personnel and their families live and work



productively and with satisfaction in an overseas environment.

-To eliminate the abuse of alcohol and drugs in the Navy through education and action programs.

-To help all Navy personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life.

-To attract and retain in the Navy people with ability, dedication, and the capacity for growth [Ref. 28].

This OPNAV instruction accomplished numerous other objectives besides just identifying the objectives of the Human Resources Management Program. It also:

- (1) Redesignated the HRDC's as Human Resource Management Centers (HRMC's).
- (2) Called for the establishment of Human Resource Management Detachments (HRMD), smaller commands responsible for a smaller region or number of commands (under an associated HRMC).
- (3) Provided a timetable for the institutionalization of the HRM program into the operational Navy by disestablishment of the HRDPO and the transfer of responsibility for scheduling and maintenance of the HRMC's/D's to the various fleet commanders.
- (4) Provided a timetable for the transfer of responsibility for the training of HRM specialists from BUPERS to Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET), with the additional requirement for the establishment of a Human Resources Basic School.
- (5) Established the Human Resources Management Cycle as the vehicle to assist commands in improving the overall performance of personnel toward mission attainment, command excellence and Navy Human Goals achievement. In addition to identifying the HRM cycle as the delivery mechanism for integrating the various Navy Human Goals program areas into the individual units, the plan defined the scheduling structure for the cycle and named the responsible implementing authorities.



(6) Called for these transfers of authority and responsibility to commence in October, 1973, and to be completed by 1 July, 1974. Personnel billets and program funds were to be transferred to Fleet Commanders and CNET by that date.

In January, 1974, both fleet and shore units began regularly scheduled HRM cycles.

## B. THE HRM CYCLE

The Human Resources Management Cycle, as it is currently practiced in the fleet (as outlined in OPNAVINST 5300.6B), is an 18 to 24 month evolution. There are 9 steps to the HRM Cycle:

Step 1. Initial visit-Outlines program to the Commanding Officer as to steps and capabilities.

Step 2. Data Gathering-Administering the HRM Survey and interviews (if required).

Step 3. Diagnosis-Organizing the raw survey results from the computer printout.

Step 4. Feedback-Provides to the unit commander and others he designates the results of the surveys and interviews.

Step 5. Planning-Developing a schedule for the 5 day HRAV based on areas of need identified in Steps 2-4.

Step 6. Human Resources Availability (HRAV) Week-Dedicated week of training, including workshops and other activities to:

- a. Further command effectiveness through optimum management of Human Resources.

- b. Develop a new or modify an existing Command Action Plan (CAP).

Step 7. Unit Action-The unit's ongoing implementation and monitoring of actions as set forth in the CAP.

Step 8. Follow On-Further assistance if required from the HRMC.



Step 9. Follow Up-Six to twelve months after HRAV to determine if additional assistance to the unit is required [Ref. 29].

The time and close involvement required for the successful completion of the HRM cycle are extensive, especially on the top management of the individual command. LCDR Ray Forbes, a guiding force in the Navy's entry into the HRM field, outlined the costs and benefits of the HRM cycle as follows:

"What does it cost?

- The commanding officer's time and attention during the several pre-HRAV meetings, taking the survey, and his possible participation in HRAV activities.

- The Executive Officer and Department Head's time for taking the survey, analyzing and interpreting it, feeding data back to immediate subordinates and their possible participation in selected HRAV activities.

- Crew time in taking the survey (about an hour each) and selected participation in the HRAV; approximate average percentage of total crew involvement during HRAV is 15-40% for the 2 to 5-day period.

- About 30 minutes time for workshop participant group in the week prior to the start of the HRAV for a prebriefing by HRMC/D staff and command representatives.

- Some increased workload for those persons who are not involved in HRAV week events.

- Scheduling priority for the involvement of key personnel for designated HRAV sessions.

- Some reduction in the unit's ability to conduct routinely scheduled events during the HRAV.

What is gained?

- A new or updated Command Action Plan (a required, written document addressing significant organizational issues and the planned means to resolve them).



-A data based picture of the current state of the human side of the organization derived from a well tested survey instrument.

-An opportunity to identify and examine areas that could result in a strengthened chain of command and improved organizational functioning.

-Planning time to focus on and address critical issues of present concern within the command.

-The specialized services of trained human resources consultants acting as staff assistants to the commanding officer.

-Improved personal skills and knowledge of command members in the human goals area.

-Development of a degree of internal capacity, through consultation" [Ref. 30].

#### C. SURVEY GUIDED DEVELOPMENT, SYSTEM FOUR AND THE U.S. NAVY

The approach that is used in the Human Resources Management cycle to accomplish organizational development is that of Survey Guided Development (SGD). The instrument involved is the 88 item HRM Survey. This survey, including those parts of it dealing with management and leadership practices is grounded in the theory of Rensis Likert. Likert was actively engaged in researching, theorizing and testing of hypothesis from the early 1940's. He and the organization he directed for many years, ISR, have had a long mutually productive arrangement with the Navy and the Office of Naval Research. Two well known achievements of his are the development of the so-called 'Likert' scale used on survey



instruments, and his theory of participative group management.

Campbell, Bownas, Peterson, and Dunnette differentiate two general models of organizational effectiveness--the goal centered approach and the natural systems approach [Ref. 31]. The goal centered approach makes the assumption that the organization is in the hands of a rational set of decision makers who pursue a finite set of explicitly stated goals. The management by objectives tradition as usually practiced tends to fall into this category. The natural systems view makes the assumption that organizational goals are so complex that it is difficult to define a smaller subset of meaningful goals. The focus is on basic systemic variables usually involving "people" factors as measured by questionnaires and not upon the state of the organization's technology or physical structure. A natural systems approach that incorporated a priori notions of what systems variables should be addressed is the model utilized by the Institute for Social Research. Likert theorizes that job satisfaction and other end-result variables are the result of organizational climate and leadership variables. Peer leadership and emergent work group processes are theorized to be intervening variables within the overall model of organizational functioning. The emphasis of this model is clearly upon groups rather than upon individuals, and Likert



states that "an organization will function best when its personnel function not as individuals but as members of highly effective work groups with high performance goals" [Ref. 32]. The emphasis is upon employee participation in decision making [Ref. 33].

Some of the basic tenents of Likert's System of Management Theory are:

(1) There are four systems of management: System One is characterized as exploitative authoritative; System Two is benevolent authoritative; System Three is consultative, and System Four is group participative.

(2) There is a "linking pin" function between heirarchies in organizations. The leaders of groups at one level within the organization will be the subordinates at the next higher level. Thus, they act as linking pins between the vertical levels.

(3) There are definite causal, intervening and end-result variables that comprise what Likert terms the 'causal flow' of events in management. By manipulating the causal (independent) variables the intervening and end-result (dependent) variables will be affected in more or less predictable ways. Likert identified the causal variables in organizational management as organizational climate and leadership; the intervening variables as peer leadership and work group processes; and the end-result variables as worker satisfaction and organizational performance. In the classic theory, climate and leadership affect peer leadership which in turn affects work group processes, and those affect the end-result variables.

In Likert's book, New Patterns of Management, Chapter 14 presents a table entitled: "Organizational and Performance Characteristics of Different Management Systems Based on a Comparable Analysis" [Ref. 34]. This table, based on Likert's theory, is a model for the Survey of Organizations (SOO) developed by Bowers and Taylor (who present it in their



book Survey of Organizations: A Machine Scored Standardized Questionnaire Instrument [Ref. 35]. .

The Navy's Z-55 group in Newport, Rhode Island, began the initial search for suitable, valid methods to conduct OD in the Navy. Since Survey Guided Development (SGD) was selected as one of the four promising strategies that went on to make up Command Development, it was normal for the Institute for Social Research, who pioneered SGD, to become involved with the Navy effort. This fact, taken together with the events surrounding the race rioting onboard ships, prompted a preliminary survey using the Survey of Organizations with a sample of 2500 Navy personnel and 2200 civilians to compare perceptions of attitudes toward their employers. The results of the survey as reported by Bowers and Franklin were:

"-As one might expect, more civilians feel negatively about their prospects for steady employment than do Navy men.

-More Navy men feel that, although their jobs require that they learn new skills, those jobs do not permit them to use the skills and abilities which they have gained, and do not view their jobs as particularly prestigious.

-Although more Navy men than civilians described their fringe benefits in favorable terms, many more Navy men than civilians view their pay in negative terms.

-Although more Navy men feel their job offers them a chance to serve their country, an even larger proportion feels that it doesn't allow them to stay in one place, and provides them an insufficient opportunity to control their personal lives. (This factor is probably the biggest negative perception Navy personnel have about the service.)

-Navy men, in far greater proportion than civilians, feel enmeshed in a large bureaucracy, one in which they are



endlessly referred from person to person when they need help, must go through a great deal of 'red-tape' to get things done, and are hemmed in by longstanding rules and regulations which no one seems able to explain" [Ref. 36].

The Survey of Organizations was accepted by the pilot group as the vehicle for data gathering in that phase of the Command Development program. It was modified for Navy use by reducing the total number of questions dealing strictly with management practices and including questions pertaining to other aspects of interest to the HRM program: race relations, equal opportunity, drug and alcohol abuse, intercultural relations/overseas diplomacy and career counseling.

Drexler performed an in depth factor analysis of the HRM survey in 1974, with recommendations for regrouping, deleting and changing the wording of questions [Ref. 37].

An HRM conference that convened in 1981 resulted in the revision of HRM survey into the 1982 version of the survey currently in use.

#### D. THE IMPACT OF SURVEY GUIDED DEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVY

The Navy's Human Resources Management Support System (HRMSS) was instituted in late 1973 under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Human Resources Management, OP-01P. In July, 1974, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, (NPRDC) San Diego, California, established a research group to conduct studies



and analysis in support of HRMSS. The HRM studies group at NPRDC has provided assistance in the following areas:

- (1) Analysis of HRM survey data to determine the effectiveness of the instrument for diagnosing organizational conditions within Naval commands as well as the survey's relationship to accepted performance measures.

- (2) Assessment of the HRM cycle impact. There were several assessments of the impact of the HRM cycle and the HRAV period utilizing various effectiveness criteria.

First, Crawford and Thomas reported early in 1975 on a test of the hypothesis that survey scores would be negatively correlated with nonjudicial punishment rates aboard ships. The results tended to support this hypothesis with correlations (using the ships as units) of from .27 to .50 with a median of .39. Second, in a later 1975 study, this time using matched pairs of ships, one as a control ship which had not received an HRAV, with the other ship as the treatment ship, Crawford states: "the HRM cycle, per se, has no significant impact upon unit level NJP (nonjudicial punishment) rates". Crawford surmises that "Definite conclusions cannot be reached as to the potential effectiveness of OD activities as they relate to disciplinary problems" [Ref. 38].

Third, in 1976, Mumford studied the relationship between HRM scores and the scores received by ships during refresher training (REFTRA). She concludes: "The results of this analysis support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between operational readiness as measured during REFTRA and the Human Resource Management System within a



ship. This is particularly true in cases where peer leadership and work group processes have produced both perceived organizational effectiveness (high HRM survey scores) and favorable performance outcomes (high REFTRA scores)" [Ref. 39].

A systematic review of the impact of the HRM cycle on the Navy was part of an overall HRM review conducted by Booz, Allen and Hamilton. The report concludes that "The impact of the HRM program, if any, has not been conclusively or satisfactorily demonstrated" [Ref. 40].

The report goes on to state that although prior NPRDC research indicated a positive correlation between HRM services and operational effectiveness, particularly for reenlistment, nonjudicial punishment, refresher training, and status of Naval Forces (NAVFORSTAT) readiness ratings, "they do not, however, necessarily imply causality". The following paragraph sums up the major difficulty with accurately assessing the impact of the HRM cycle within the Navy:

"Even at the theoretical level, the relationship between the HRM program and operational readiness is an indirect one; the HRM program is designed to address the area of command management of human resources issues and problems (e.g. command climate) which is but one of a number of factors which impact on operational effectiveness. In trying to establish a direct impact on the basis of an indirect relationship, it is necessary to control for the large number of other factors which affect the situation. These other factors (e.g. operating schedules, spare parts, support, etc.) act as antecedent, bias or obscure the relationship between HRM services and operational effectiveness which might exist. Given that the Navy is an operational rather than a laboratory environment, it is



extremely difficult to even measure the effect of outside variables, and almost impossible to control their influence" [Ref. 41].

#### E. SUMMARY

The NPRDC reports tend to support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between Naval organizational effectiveness and participative group style of management. Due to Likert's association of effective performance with System Four management, there exists a bias in the wording of the questions toward participative-group management in both the Survey of Organizations and the Navy's HRM survey. In theory, when the survey results are fed back to the command, the command should automatically target for improvement all areas that fail to score in the System Four range. In practice, however, this is not always what happens. Command results are often compared to fleet norms and areas which fall below fleet norms are those that receive emphasis.

Likert's underlying theory is that the ideal state for any organization is System Four (participative group). The authors feel, however, that while participative group management may work well in some organizations, such as in the private sector, it may not work as well in other organizations, such as in the military.

Chapter Four will discuss the hypothesis of this study and present the methodology used.



#### IV. METHODOLOGY

##### A. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

This thesis is a continuation of a research effort started in 1981 to provide assistance in defining where the Navy's Human Resource Management Program should be headed in the future. The first study completed in this effort was a paper presented by Gettys and Maxwell in 1981 [Ref. 42]. Their purpose was to study organizational effectiveness in the military, comparing Army and Navy officers. The purpose of this paper is to continue this research effort by implementing some of the recommendations suggested in the Gettys-Maxwell thesis. We will discuss these recommendations in appropriate sections of this chapter. However, we will be focusing on the perceptions of just one of the groups used in their thesis, that of operational Navy personnel.

The specific objective of this study is to examine the perceptions of experienced Naval personnel as to how an effective Naval organization "should" operate, rather than how any specific unit is "currently" operating.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that perceptions of experienced Naval personnel of what an effective Naval organization should look like are not consistent with System Four (participative group) management. Given the opportunity to describe an ideal effective Naval organization, on a



Likert scale, they will not select System Four as being the most effective for the Navy. The rationale of this theory lies in the values inherent in the military culture. Given these values, such as the emphasis of the integrity of the chain of command, the wearing of rank on the shoulder, and the emphasis on command, communications and control, the authors believe that the most effective style of management will not be a purely participative group style of management, but that it will tend toward a consultative (System Three) style of management.

#### B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The data collection methods used to gather these perceptions were interviews and a modified version of the Navy's HRM survey. The major modification made to the survey was to change the perspective of the questions. The HRM survey is designed to measure the "current" command climate of Naval organizations. The survey questions were modified to measure an "ideal" command's climate by the addition, at the beginning of each question, of the phrase, "In an effective organization..." This modified format was used by Gettys-Maxwell and the authors felt it would serve present purposes equally well. The intent in modifying the questions was to give the respondents the opportunity to describe their



perceptions of what "ideal" working conditions in an organization would be like.

In addition to the modified question format, the number of questions was reduced from that used in either the HRM survey (88) or the Gettys-Maxwell paper (100). The authors eliminated first the particularly Navy oriented questions not originally related in any way to the Survey of Organizations (e.g. EO, substance abuse, overseas duty support, career transitioning).

Second, the questions from Fleishman's Leadership Profile used by Gettys-Maxwell were eliminated.

The remaining questions were then individually evaluated for the purpose of reducing the total number further since one of the constraints of data gathering was that the survey was administered on a voluntary basis, and it was felt that the less time the questionnaire took to complete the more likely were commands to agree to take it. The requirements set were that there would be questions from the remaining dimensions represented in the survey and at least one question from each index in the different dimensions would be included. The authors then chose questions that were of interest or that were felt would shed additional information on the working conditions found in "effective" organizations. Appendix A is a copy of the questionnaire and Appendix B lists the rationale behind the selection of each question.



In addition to the "climate" type survey questions used, the results of the three "HRM Program Success" questions used by Gettys-Maxwell were of particular interest. These questions asked respondents' opinions regarding the success of HRMC/D's over the past three years, the current potential for success, and the expectation for success in the next three years, in assisting commands in becoming effective organizations. Why was the mean score of the question concerning the future potential for HRM program success lower than the mean score for present HRM program success? It was important to explore this specific area further to see if the same difference of means was displayed in a different study sample. Therefore, the three HRM program success questions were included.

In addition to administering surveys as data collection devices, personal interviews were conducted for the purposes of giving the authors a better understanding of why respondents answered questions on the survey the way they did, and to better understand their perceptions of different management practices and how those practices affect working conditions in an organization.

The authors had initially planned to analyze the survey data first and then develop interview questions that pertained to significant areas obtained from analysis of the entire data set. However, due to time and geographical



constraints, the authors developed the interview questions from the subset of the data available at the time interviews were, out of necessity, to be conducted.

Using the available data, one hundred respondents, the data were examined and questions were developed around survey questions that displayed high or low mean scores and significant differences in the distribution of answers between officers and enlisted personnel. Based on this rough form of analysis, we developed thirty questions to be used for interviews. Appendix C shows the questions used for interviews and the reasons they were chosen. In addition to responding specifically to questions, the personnel being interviewed were also asked "why" they answered a question in a particular way. The authors' hope was to establish the contextual framework of the respondent in this manner.

### C. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The hypothesis of this study concerns the perceptions of experienced Naval personnel. One of the recommendations made in the Gettys-Maxwell paper was that their study be expanded. "While the data collected are valuable in evaluating the perceptions of the military leadership regarding organizational effectiveness, the relative size of the sample is not adequate" [Ref. 43]. To make data more meaningful, this study intended to significantly enlarge the size of the sample and to obtain a broader cross section of the Navy



operational population. It was critical to include in this study senior petty officers to ascertain their perceptions and philosophies regarding organizational effectiveness. Because this research was concerned with obtaining information about the perceptions of "fleet experienced" Naval personnel, the sample included enlisted personnel in the paygrades of E-5 to E-9 and officers in the paygrades of O-2 to O-6. The authors felt that by the time the enlisted personnel reached the E-5 level their base of operational experience would be such that they would have been exposed to numerous naval organizations that would have practiced and/or experienced a variety of leadership, management and decision making styles. Similarly, officer personnel in the rank of O-2 and above would have had sufficient opportunity to gain comparable experience owing to both the increased time required to advance in paygrade and the additional educational background required initially.

Letters were sent to unit commanding officers, with whom the authors had previous acquaintance, explaining both the purpose of the survey research and the Navy policy on surveying commands, and requesting their permission for and assistance in administering a survey. We requested this assistance from six commands and received a positive response from five promising assistance in administering the survey to personnel within their command. The survey sample was taken



from two helicopter squadrons (one operational and one training), a jet aircraft training squadron, a helicopter wing staff, and a surface vessel fleet training center.

Although this approach to the problem of obtaining a sample of 'fleet experienced' Naval personnel overcame the time and policy constraints, it limited the population available for sampling. What was used was essentially a sample of convenience, and, as such, the results of the survey may be biased in unpredictable ways. Therefore, the generalizability of the analysis of the research may be less than what was desired by the authors.

Another constraint on the research was time and travel funds for interviewing. Interviews were conducted in conjunction with a previously scheduled and funded trip to Charleston Naval Station. Several days were added to that trip to allow time to conduct interviews at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida.

The interview sample consisted of personnel assigned to a helicopter squadron located at NAS Jacksonville, and ranged from E-5 to O-5 in paygrade. The Charleston Naval Station personnel interviewed ranged from E-5 to O-6 and were made up of personnel assigned to a Fleet Training Center.



#### D. SURVEY ANALYSIS PLAN

All responses to the questionnaires were coded and entered onto the computer to be utilized with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The analysis of the survey data will be accomplished using the programs contained in the SPSS package.

The plan for the analysis is as follows. The survey sample will first be broken down demographically to investigate the distribution of the survey sample. The overall sample mean and sample variance will be computed and the sample mean will be discussed in relationship to participative group management (Likert's System Four). Following this, means for each group will be compared by rank, time in service, community (aviation, surface, other), geographic area of service (east coast, west coast), and attendance at Leadership and Management Education Training (LMET).

The statistical analysis will include the means of all the indices, and questions, as appropriate. A criterion of two-thirds of the original questions from each index was used naming the indices. Indices that met this criterion, retained their original index name. If the number of questions in each index did not meet this criterion, the indices were renamed to more accurately reflect the content of the question used. As a result of this criterion, fifteen



of the original indices were renamed, thus creating a total of twenty-one new indices. Because of the high number of indices that were renamed, indices were not aggregated into dimensions as in the HRM Survey. Appendix D is a code book of how the data file is arranged and how questions were coded into index or renamed.

The analysis will conclude with a discussion of the differences of the various subgroups concerning trends or patterns in conceptualizations personnel have of ideal Naval organizations (as a function of rank, time in service, area, type of community, and previous experience in management education in the Navy).

The next chapter will discuss the results of the data analysis.



## V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

### A. SURVEY RETURN

Five hundred (500) questionnaires were mailed out in August, 1982 to the five commands that had previously committed their support to this research project. All the surveys returned had been received by the end of October, 1982. The number of surveys sent to each of the commands varied with the size of the command, from as few as thirty to as many as one hundred fifty. Of the 500 surveys sent out, 295 were eventually completed and returned, for an overall return rate of 59%. In most instances, the return rate was considerably lower than what had been anticipated (upwards of 80%) given the strategy of only sending surveys to commands that had previously committed themselves to assist in the administration of the survey. However, the overall return rate is considered good for a survey of this type.

Table I shows the survey distribution and rates of return by command surveyed. As can be seen, three of the commands had fairly good return rates with the helo wing staff having the highest at 97%. Two of the commands had fairly low return rates, well below the 50% level, the lowest being the jet training squadron with a 41% return rate.



Table I

## Survey Distribution and Return Rate by Command

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>SURVEYS DISTRIBUTED</u>	<u>SURVEYS RETURNED</u>	<u>RETURN RATE</u>
Helo Trng Sqdn	100	43	43%
Helo Wing Staff	30	29	97%
Helo Opr Sqdn	70	48	69%
Fleet Trng Cen	150	114	76%
<u>Jet Trng Sqdn</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>41%</u>
TOTALS	500	295	59%

While we believe that this marked difference in the return rates is probably due to availability, or lack of availability of personnel at the time the survey was administered, we realized that there was a possibility that the return rates could be correlated with the command overall sample mean. In other words, we were interested to see whether a low return rate corresponded to a low overall sample mean for a command or vice versa.

To examine this, we computed the overall sample mean by command. Table II displays the command return rate and the command sample mean. As can be seen, there does not appear to be any correlation between the two figures. The lowest return rate of 41% for the jet training squadron corresponds to the highest sample mean score of 4.18. On the other hand, the helo training squadron, which had the second lowest



return rate of 43% had the lowest sample mean score. The helo wing staff had the highest return rate of 97% but had a sample mean score of 4.11, which was also the median command sample mean. The authors therefore believe that the differences in command return rates were not due to the command climate nor to the command personnel perceptions of how naval organizations should operate.

Table II

Return Rates and Sample Means by Command

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>RETURN RATE</u>	<u>COMMAND MEAN</u>
Helo Trng Sqdn	43%	3.96
Helo Wing Staff	97%	4.11
Helo Opn Sqdn	69%	3.99
Fleet Trng Cen	76%	4.13
Jet Trng Sqdn	41%	4.18

We next examined the distribution of the sample by the demographic information requested in the survey. Figures 5.1 through 5.8 show how the sample was distributed by rank, sex, time in service (TIS), area of assignment (AREA), type of command (TYCOM), and attendance at LMET and other distributions, as appropriate.

The distribution by rank fell out much the way we expected. Figure 5.1 shows that there were small numbers of the most senior enlisted and officer personnel which was



expected due to the length of time in service required to attain these grades, and the small number of E-9, O-5, and O-6 positions in most commands. The distribution also showed high numbers of the middle managers in both the enlisted and officer ranks, presumably due to the fact that most commands have more personnel positions in the E-6 and O-3 grades. Figure 5.2 also helps explain the high number of middle managers in the sample. Some 54 of the 61 (88%) respondents from the jet training squadron were in this category.




Figure 5.1 Distribution by Rank






Figure 5.2 Distribution of Rank in the Jet Trng Sqdn

The distribution by sex was heavily skewed toward males. As shown in Figure 5.3, female respondents totaled only ten, 3.4%. With such a small female sample, it would be unlikely that any valid statements could be made about the larger population. Therefore, the authors did not include this variable in the analysis.




Figure 5.3 Distribution by Sex



Figure 5.4 shows that the distribution of respondents by time in service is well spread, with the highest number of respondents having from 5-7 years time in service and the lowest number having from 23-25 years.




Figure 5.4 Distribution by Time in Service (TIS)

The distribution of respondents by area, as shown in Figure 5.5, was skewed heavily toward the east coast due to the fact that all the commands surveyed were located on the east coast. The 4.1% shown as "other" were respondents reporting having been homeported overseas most of the time. The "other" category in the group will not be used in further comparisons due to its small size.






Figure 5.5 Distribution by Area

The distribution of the type of community (TYCOM) was skewed heavily toward aviation. This was a result of the initial method of selecting units to participate in the research. Since the authors were most familiar with personnel in aviation units, four of the five commands were aviation. Figure 5.6 shows that there were 36 respondents, 12.2% of the population that fell in the "other" category. Visual inspection of the survey responses revealed that 24 of the 36 were from the submarine community.




Figure 5.6 Distribution by Type of Command (TYCOM)



Figure 5.7 shows the distribution by attendance at LMET. It was surprising to see that so many personnel had not received LMET. Figure 5.8 shows that of the one hundred twenty that had not had LMET, sixty-nine (57.5%) were E-5's or E-6's and thirty-nine (32.5%) were O-2's or O-3's. Broken down by time in service, 78% of the non-attenders at LMET had less than ten years in the service. This helps explain the numbers of non-attenders at LMET as most Navy personnel are sent to LMET after approximately ten years of service, at which time it is fairly certain that they are career oriented.

#### Attendance at LMET




Figure 5.7 Distribution by Attendance at LMET

#### B. GROUP MEAN DATA

The statistical analysis portion of the thesis will consist of two sections. The first section will present a statistical analysis of the survey results obtained for the sample (n=295) and for the five subgroupings that were used. A discussion of these results will be presented together with






Figure 5.8 Distribution of Non-Attenders at LMET by Rank

the analysis. The second section will present a comparative analysis of results between the subgroups.

The authors used five major demographic groupings to categorize respondents. The five groups were labelled Rank, TIS (time in service), Area (U.S. East or West Coast), LMET (Leadership and Management Education and Training) and TYCOM (type of community). These five major demographic groups were further broken down into sixteen subgroups. Rank was broken down into four categories: Junior Enlisted (E-5 through E-6); Senior Enlisted (E-7 through E-9); Junior Officer (O-1 through O-3); and Senior Officer (O-4 through O-6). TIS was broken down into four categories by years of time in service: First Termers (2 through 7 years);



Midgraders (8 through 13 years); Careerists (14 through 22 years); Careerists Plus (23 years or more). Area was broken down into three categories, but only two had enough respondents to use. Area categorized respondents according to where they had been homeported the majority of their active duty time: (East Coast or West Coast). LMET categorized personnel by whether or not they had attended LMET previously or not. TYCOM was broken down into three categories: (Surface, Aviation, Other-primarily Submarine).

Table III presents the overall sample mean and the means from each of the subgroups.

Table III

Table of Means by Respondent Subgroup

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>SIZE (N= )</u>	<u>OVERALL SUBGROUP MEAN SCORE</u>
Sample	295	4.09
Junior Enlisted	129	3.95
Senior Enlisted	61	4.34
Junior Officers	79	4.11
Senior Officers	26	4.20
First Termers	111	4.00
Midgraders	90	4.09
Careerists	82	4.20
Careerists Plus	12	4.23
LMET Attendee	174	4.14
LMET Non-Attendee	120	4.03
Surface	79	4.11
Aviation	179	4.07
Other	36	4.17
East Coast	225	4.10
West Coast	57	4.10



## 1. Overall Sample Results

The original hypothesis of this paper is that given an opportunity to describe, through the medium of a modified HRM questionnaire, and ideally effective naval organization, experienced fleet personnel would not choose System Four (participative group) management. In observing the overall sample mean score, it would indeed appear that "fleet experienced" personnel would not choose System Four management as descriptive of the management system used in an 'ideally effective' naval organization. In the aggregate, the sample population mean over all indices was 4.09. Thus, the sample mean lies almost exactly on the breakpoint of 4.0 on the Likert scale separating his System Three management (consultative) and System Four management, indicating an association between effective naval organizations and management methods that are partially consultative and partially participative.

What is meant by consultative management or participative-group management? It may be helpful to excerpt briefly from Likert's New Patterns of Management. On consultative management, Likert states, "In 'consultative' management, the higher echelon may discuss a problem with one or all of the persons on the lower echelon(s), but the decision is often made without any real participation by the lower eschelons" [Ref. 44]. On participative management he



states, "Persons in organizations operating under the newer (System Four) theory...exercise greater influence upon what happens in the organization. This is true at every heirarchical level from nonsupervisory personnel to the head of the organization" [Ref. 45].

For the purposes of this study, the authors are defining (at least numerically) System One as being indicated by survey response scores of between 1 and 2, System Two between 2 and 3, System Three between 3 and 4, and System Four between 4 and 5. Additionally, although the authors recognize that Likert uses consistent scores across most or all survey indices as indicative of a particular approach or "system" of management, for the purposes of the study the authors will use subgroup scores on single indices or blocks of indices to relate the subgroup to a particular system of management.

Referring again to Table III, in all cases the subgroup's mean scores were never more than .3 apart from the overall sample mean, so in terms of the absolute scores of the subgroups there seems to be agreement by all subgroups that the consultative-participative method was associated with the 'ideally effective' naval organization.

## 2. Mean Scores by Rank

The largest differences in the index scores occurred in the Rank group. Within the Rank group, the largest



differences in the subgroup mean scores were between the junior enlisted subgroup and the senior enlisted subgroup. The junior enlisted subgroup, consisting of E-5 and E-6 personnel, had an overall mean on the questionnaire of 3.95. The senior enlisted personnel subgroup, consisting of E-7, E-8 and E-9 personnel, had an overall mean of 4.34. This significant difference tends to indicate that there are real differences between the philosophies espoused by these two subgroups. It may show that the junior enlisted personnel associated organizational effectiveness less with System Four management than they did with System Three management. The junior officer subgroup, consisting of O-2 and O-3 officers had an overall mean of 4.11. The senior officer subgroup, consisting of O-4, O-5 and O-6 personnel, had a mean of 4.19. Although this was not a significant difference at the .05 level, it may nonetheless indicate a shift toward greater association of organizationally effective management methods with System Four in the higher ranks. The correlation coefficient between the overall mean score for the survey and the independent variable Rank was .16, indicative of a positive but relatively weak relationship between the two variables.

### 3. Mean Scores by Time in Service

The four subgroups that composed the TIS group showed a slight trend toward increases in mean scores as a function



of increases in time in service. The first subgroup, first termers, consisting of personnel with from 2-7 years in service, had a mean score on the questionnaire of 4.00. The second subgroup, midgraders, consisting of personnel with 8-13 years, had a mean score of 4.08. The third subgroup, careerists, consisting of personnel with from 14-22 years of service, had a mean score of 4.20. The fourth subgroup, careerists plus, consisting of personnel with 23 years of service or more, had a mean score of 4.23. The correlation coefficient between time in service and the overall sample mean score was .16, indicating that time in service does affect in some measure the way that respondents answered the questionnaire. This trend may mean that the more organizationally "good" or "bad" commands that an individual has watched operate over the years, the more that the individual associates effective organizations with System Four management methods. It may also mean that individuals with lots of time in service are also very senior persons and if they routinely have to delegate a lot of responsibility for decision making to lower levels, that they associate participative methods and effectiveness more readily.

#### 4. Mean Scores by LMET

The next group was LMET and was composed of the subgroups of individuals who had previously attended LMET and those that had not. It was expected that the theories



presented as part of the training on modern management practices in the Navy would tend to drive the scores of the attendees higher than the non-attendees. This was not found to be the case at a level of significance of .92.

#### 5. Mean Scores by Area

The fourth subgrouping was by the variable Area, whether the respondent had spent the majority of their active duty time in a command homeported on the East Coast, the West Coast or 'other', primarily overseas. By subgrouping in this manner any management biases resulting in some way from having been associated mainly with the East Coast or West Coast might be shown. Because of the small number of 'other' respondents, this category was not included in the analysis. On average, there was no discernable differences between the two subgroup scores, with the East Coast subgroup having a mean index score of 4.10 and the West Coast also 4.10. It is possible that the subgroup sample size was not big enough to reveal any differences that really are there in the total population. It is equally possible that there are no discernable differences in what type of management methods are most associated with effective organizations on the basis of area.

#### 6. Mean Scores by TYCOM

The fifth independent variable that was used for analyzing the data was TYCOM, the particular community the



respondent was from, surface, aviation or 'other' primarily subsurface. It was expected that because of the traditionally more technical orientation associated with submarine and modern aircraft that personnel from these communities might favor System Four type management to a greater degree than their surface counterparts. The reasoning was that in the more technical ratings, the influence of personnel is more highly correlated with the level of technical expertise. Since technical expertise is not solely a function of seniority (although it is recognized that greater experience can lead to greater expertise) it might be reasonable for influence to be shared, for input into the decision making process to be sought more widely by the decision maker in the work group. The differences in the mean scores across all indices did not reflect biases toward management styles on the basis of community, however. The aviation subgroup overall index score was lower than the surface group which, in turn, was lower than the 'other'-submarine group. The small range of the scores indicated, more than anything else, that there is some consensus about the management methods and style 'experienced' personnel associated with effective organization, no matter which community is queried.

As Maxwell-Gettys pointed out in their research on Army and Navy offices, and as the authors of this research



have found, 'experienced' Navy personnel associate an approach to management and decision making that falls between Systems Three and Four with effective organizations in the Navy.

#### C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY RANK

As explained in the previous chapter, we developed a total of twenty-five indices from the thirty-eight questions used in the survey. The three HRM success questions were left as separate questions. The data were then broken down into groups using the demographic information reported by the respondents. A t-test was used to determine which group means were statistically significantly different.

We first looked at the rank groups of junior enlisted, senior enlisted, junior officer and senior officer. It seemed to us that if there existed significant differences in mean scores between groups, they would exist between different combinations of the rank groups. We also felt that these group comparisons would provide us with information that would be of greater importance than the other demographic groups as rank is emphasized throughout the Navy and in all areas and types of commands.

This section is a discussion of the results of the comparisons of the different groups.



## 1. Junior Enlisted Versus Senior Enlisted

Referring to Table IV, when we compared these two groups, we found a significant difference in the overall group mean score of 3.95 for junior enlisted personnel and 4.34 for senior enlisted personnel. We then looked at the index mean scores to see where the differences were between these two groups. The t-test showed a significant difference in every index except two. Those indices showing no significant difference in mean scores were command climate-problem awareness and supervisory leadership-goal emphasis. It hardly seems relevant to discuss all the indices individually given the large quantity of indices that were significantly different.

Every index showed a mean score considerably higher for senior enlisted, .39 higher on the average, than the junior enlisted mean scores. Even with the t-test showing no significant difference in the two aforementioned indices, the senior enlisted mean was higher in each case. This would appear to indicate that the senior enlisted personnel are more oriented toward participative management than the junior enlisted personnel. With the junior enlisted mean in the consultative style range with a mean of 3.95, it appears that they feel their level of participation should be slightly lower than the participative group style. However, it occurred to us that this lower mean score could also be a



Table IV

## Index by Rank Subgroup Score

	<u>INDEX</u>	<u>JR ENL</u>	<u>SR ENL</u>	<u>JR OFF</u>	<u>SR OFF</u>
1.	Command Climate Communications Flow	4.11	4.40	4.20	4.38
2.	Command Climate Decision Making	3.88	4.26	4.14	4.31
3.	Command Climate Recognition	3.93	4.46	4.34	4.54
4.	Command Climate Personnel Welfare	4.11	4.51	4.53	4.58
5.	Command Climate Goals and Objectives	4.29	4.57	4.42	4.46
6.	Command Climate Problem Awareness	3.82	4.08	3.90	4.15
7.	Supervisory Leadership Support	3.94	3.24	4.02	3.96
8.	Supervisory Leadership Team Coord.	3.87	4.46	3.96	4.08
9.	Supervisory Leadership Team Emphasis	4.32	4.64	4.41	4.54
10.	Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.42	4.57	4.52	4.27
11.	Supervisory Leadership Work Facilita.	3.98	4.34	4.00	4.19
12.	Peer Leadership Personal Problems	3.64	4.03	3.80	3.77
13.	Peer Leadership Team Coordination	3.79	4.26	3.75	3.92
14.	Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	4.01	4.49	4.18	4.23
15.	Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.02	4.48	4.14	4.19
16.	Peer Leadership Problem Solving	3.92	4.30	4.09	4.19
17.	Work Group Coordination	3.73	4.25	3.87	4.23
18.	Work Group Decision Making	3.91	4.21	4.08	4.15
19.	Work Group Readiness	3.76	4.25	3.87	3.92
20.	Work Group Order and Discipline	4.12	4.61	4.37	4.50
22.	Lower Level Influence	3.31	3.61	3.61	3.38
23.	Leadership and Training	3.98	4.31	4.05	4.00
24.	Progress Satisfaction	3.87	4.39	4.19	4.23
25.	Promotion Satisfaction	3.87	4.38	4.22	4.54
26.	Grand Organization Style	3.95	4.34	4.11	4.19

JR ENL = JUNIOR ENLISTED SUBGROUP  
 JR OFF = JUNIOR OFFICER SUBGROUP

SR ENL = SENIOR ENLISTED SUBGROUP  
 SR OFF = SENIOR OFFICER SUBGROUP



reflection of the styles of management that they have experienced throughout their career rather than their perceptions of an ideal command. Even though the questions were phrased "In an effective organization", it may be hard for personnel to completely wipe out the past experiences and imagine something different than they have ever experienced in previous commands.

## 2. Junior Enlisted Versus Junior Officer

The overall group mean scores were closer together for these two groups, with 3.95 for junior enlisted and 4.11 for junior officers. This is an average difference of only .171. It appears that these two groups have perceptions that more closely parallel each other than the previous comparison groups. This may be due to the relative short time in service for both groups, again relying more on past experience and management styles that they have experienced than on their perceptions of an effective organization.

The comparison of indices showed fewer significant differences in index mean scores between these two groups than the previous comparison. The t-test showed significant differences in six index mean scores; command climate-decision making, command climate-recognition, command climate-personnel welfare, lower level influence, progress satisfaction and promotion satisfaction. In every index but one, that of peer leadership-team coordination, the junior



officers recorded higher mean scores than did the junior enlisted personnel, but there was no significant differences in the means of this index.

The command climate-decision making index is a composite of three decision making related questions. Again, we wondered if this might be a carry over of the past experiences because of the low mean score (3.88) by junior enlisted personnel. To investigate this index further, we broke the index down by question and ran a student's T-test to compare the question mean scores. Questions 4 and 5 consider decision making at the level where the most adequate information is available and the sharing of information to give decision makers access to all available know-how, respectively. Question 6 refers to asking people for their ideas when decisions are made. Questions 4 and 5 showed significant differences while Question 6 showed no significant difference. In both Questions 4 and 5, the junior officers scored well into the participative group range while the junior enlisted were low participative group or high consultative. This appears to indicate that junior enlisted feel that all levels of command should be consulted to get information but that the decisions should be made at higher levels in the command.

The mean scores for Question 6 were 3.67 for the junior enlisted personnel and 3.86 for the junior officers.



While there was no significant difference between the two group means, both were fairly well down into the consultative range. It was surprising that these scores were so different than the previous two questions. Again, the low mean scores from both groups seems to indicate that they perceive their role to be consultative rather than participative in the decision making process.

A closely related index is that of lower level influence. The group mean scores for this index were 3.31 for junior enlisted and 3.61 for junior officers. These two mean scores were the lowest index scores in this comparison. This index shows that both groups are consultative in regards to the amount of lower level influence that should exist in the command. Again, it is surprising to us to see such a low score for the junior enlisted personnel, as they are the supervisors at the lower level referred to in the index. Their score of 3.31 is low in the consultative range which seems to indicate that they don't believe that they should have much influence in what goes on in the command and that they definitely should not participate in the command decision making process.

By breaking this index down by the two questions that comprise it, we found additional information that helps explain the low score for both groups. Question 31 investigates the amount of influence that lower level



supervisors should have in the command. While there was a significant difference in the scores in the two groups for this question, the scores were in the upper range of the consultative style with a score of 3.65 for junior enlisted and 3.94 for junior officers. This difference could be due to the difference in the time the two groups have in the service or the experience base of the junior enlisted personnel who are really talking about themselves when they say that lower level supervisors should be consulted rather than participate. This difference could also be due to the education of the average junior officer, that is, his liberal arts background that suggests that everyone should have input in decisions that affect them.

The scores for Question 32, which investigates the amount of non-supervisory influence perceived, were really low, lower than any other single question (with the exception of the HRM program success questions) with scores of 2.97 for junior enlisted and 3.29 for junior officers. While the score of 2.97 is close to the 3 mark, between consultative and benevolent authoritative, it is still in the range of the latter and has some indication that junior enlisted feel that non-supervisory personnel should be asked for opinions, then told what to do. Junior officers are in the lower end of the consultative range indicating that they feel that non-supervisory personnel should at least be consulted and have



some influence in the decisions that affect their work group or department.

The command climate-recognition index also showed a significant difference in mean scores. The reported scores were 3.93 for junior enlisted and 4.34 for junior officers. These scores seem to indicate that junior officers believe that recognition for hard work is a bigger morale factor than the junior enlisted believe it to be. This was surprising as it is the enlisted personnel that do the work and tend to want recognition for the hard work they do. Again, this difference may be due to the advanced education level of the junior officers. However, it may also be due to junior enlisted placing less emphasis on recognition because they get satisfaction from just knowing that they have done a good job.

The command climate-personnel welfare index showed the greatest significant difference in this comparison with scores of 4.2 and 4.5 for junior enlisted and junior officers, respectively. This is also surprising as this question asks about the command interest in the welfare and morale of assigned personnel. While both scores are into the participative group range, we expected junior enlisted to score higher because they are down at the level where they have to deal regularly with lack of command interest in the morale and welfare of their personnel. Again, the only thing



we can think of that would account for this difference is the fact that the junior enlisted responses may have been affected more by experience than by their perceptions of the ideal command.

The last two indices mentioned as having significant differences in this comparison were progress satisfaction and promotion satisfaction. Junior enlisted scores were identical for both indices at 3.9 while junior officers scored right at the 4.2 level for both indices. There is not much doubt in our minds that this difference is due to the difference in the promotion systems of the two rank groups. Junior officer promotions are fairly automatic through the junior officer ranks while junior enlisted personnel have to be recommended for promotion and then pass the Navy advancement examination in order to be promoted to the next grade.

### 3. Junior Enlisted Versus Senior Officer

The overall mean scores for these two groups also showed a significant difference. However, the difference was less than the difference between the junior enlisted and senior enlisted personnel. This was not surprising as we expected senior enlisted personnel to be more participative group oriented than senior officers as senior enlisted seem to be more aware of the needs of the personnel under them than the senior officers are.



There were ten indices that showed significant differences in mean scores at the .05 level of significance. Five of these indices were in the command climate area; communications flow, decision making, recognition, personnel welfare and problem awareness. The other indices were peer leadership-problem solving, work group-coordination, work group-order and discipline, progress satisfaction, and promotion satisfaction.

The biggest single difference in this comparison appeared in the promotion satisfaction index which is not surprising given that the senior officers have made their promotions and do not have to worry about getting promoted to be able to make the twenty year mark. The progress satisfaction index has similar implications.

The other indices that showed a rather large significant difference were in the command climate indices. Command climate-recognition showed a big difference with the junior enlisted personnel at 3.93 and senior officers at 4.54. It is somewhat surprising that senior officers would score so much higher on this index than junior enlisted who are actually down there in the ranks doing the hard work. We expected more the opposite scores, with junior enlisted personnel scoring higher than the senior officers. However, this may be due to a change in the attitudes of the officers



that has resulted from the increased HRM activities over the past few years.

In the decision making index, the junior enlisted were solidly down in the consultative range at 3.88 while senior officers were at 4.3, towards the middle of the participative group range. When we examined this index by question, we found a significant difference in all three questions. This is not surprising as these questions talk about the level at which decisions should be made and the sharing of available know-how. We expected officers to score high as they would think that they would have the most adequate information with which to make decisions because of having been kept informed of everything that goes on in the command. However, we expected junior enlisted to score higher than they did, at least into the participative group range, which would have indicated that they felt they should participate in the decision making process at their level when they have information affecting the decisions being made. Their score, however, seems to indicate that they perceive their role as a consultative one rather than a participative one.

The command climate-communications flow index questions are closely related to those of decision making. There were significant differences in the scores of the first two questions but not in the scores of the third question.



Even with the significant differences in reported scores, all were in the participative group range. This seems to indicate that both groups feel that communications flow is very important for the organization to be an effective one. The highest score of 4.6 came from the senior officers on Question 2 which would appear to indicate that they feel that the command should do a good job of putting out the word. The difference here probably comes from the perspectives and experiences of the two groups, the senior officers feeling that it's extremely important and that they really do a good job of putting out the word. Junior enlisted personnel also feel that it is important but experience reflects that it really doesn't happen the way it should. These same ideas are probably the reasons for the differences in the scores of the two groups in the personnel welfare and problem awareness indices in the command climate area.

It was surprising to see scores of 3.92 and 3.73, still in the consultative range, for junior enlisted in the peer leadership-problem solving and work group-coordination indices, respectively. In both of these areas we would have anticipated that junior enlisted would have been up in the participative group range. The differences in these two indices can probably be explained due to the senior officers' recognition of the importance of peer leadership and work



group coordination while junior enlisted are still more independent and self reliant.

The work group-order and discipline index also showed a significant difference in the mean scores. While both scores were well into the participative group range, the senior officers' score of 4.5 reflects their emphasis on order and discipline as a necessity from the command or superior officer standpoint while junior enlisted would cut personnel a little more slack in the work group.

#### 4. Senior Enlisted Versus Junior Officer

While there was a statistical significant difference in the group scores of these two groups, both mean scores were in the participative group range, the senior enlisted at 4.34 and the junior officers at 4.11. The fact that the senior enlisted scored higher is not surprising because of their extended time of service compared to a relatively short amount of service for the junior officers.

There were a total of twelve indices in this comparison that showed a significant difference in the index mean scores, more than any other comparison group. These indices were command climate-communications flow, supervisory leadership-support, supervisory leadership-team coordination, supervisory leadership-team emphasis, supervisory leadership-work facilitation, peer leadership-team coordination, peer leadership-team emphasis, peer



leadership-goal emphasis, work group-coordination, work group-readiness, work group-order and discipline, and goal integration. It was surprising that there were no significant differences between these groups in the decision making or lower level influence areas as we expected senior enlisted would score considerably higher in these indices, favoring more participation in decision making and lower level influence than the junior officers. The decision making scores were very close and the lower level influence scores were identical at 3.61.

In this comparison, unlike the previous comparisons, there was only one index that was significantly different in the command climate area, that of communications flow. When examined by question, only Question 1 showed a significant difference. While both scores were in the participative group range, the senior enlisted scored considerably higher at 4.47, than the junior officers.

In the supervisory leadership area, four of the five indices were significantly different. It is not surprising that the senior enlisted personnel would score higher in those areas as these indices deal with supervisors' behavior and increasing the group members' worth and dignity, something that each senior enlisted person has had to deal with personally as a supervisor. The junior officer would not have had the opportunity to be a direct supervisor in



charge of lower ranking personnel and might not be as aware of the importance of this aspect of supervision.

There were three peer leadership indices reporting significant differences in mean scores between these two groups. These indices deal with the behavior of the work group members toward each other. The peer leadership-team coordination index showed a junior officer score of 3.75, well down in the consultative group. This index specifically deals with the extent that work group members should take responsibility for resolving disagreements and working out acceptable solutions among themselves. The difference here seems to be due to the junior officer feeling that the work group members should not take the problem solving responsibility upon themselves, but rather they should pass it on up the chain to supervisors for resolution. Senior enlisted, on the other hand, realize the importance of letting work group members take participative responsibility for solving disagreements and problems within the group. The other two peer leadership indices, team emphasis and goal emphasis, reported significant differences for somewhat the same reasons, that senior enlisted recognize the importance of working together as a team and putting forth their best effort will result in better relationships between work group members.



Three of the four work group indices showed significant differences in mean scores with junior officers scoring well down into the consultative range at 3.87 for coordination and 3.88 for readiness. It was surprising that the junior officers would score low in these two indices and not in the other work group index, that of problem solving. The low score in peer leadership-team coordination (3.75) does not relate with a high score (4.08) in work group-decision making. The difference in these two indices seems to come from the different tense of the question, "take responsibility" versus "expected to" make good decisions and solve problems. It seems, then, that junior officers expect work groups to make good decisions but don't really believe that they do. The fact that junior officers scored low on work group-readiness seems to indicate that they believe that the work group should not be expected to handle emergency situations without supervision.

The highest index mean score for senior enlisted was reported in the work group-order and discipline index. Senior enlisted reported a 4.61 mean for this index and junior officers reported a 4.37. While both groups are close to middle participative group, the higher score for senior enlisted indicates that they place more emphasis on good order and discipline than junior officers do, probably



because of their extended length of service and many dealings with the junior enlisted ranks.

#### 5. Senior Enlisted Versus Senior Officer

There was no significant difference between the overall group mean scores of these two groups. The overall group means were 4.34 for senior enlisted and 4.2 for senior officers. There were only three indices that reported significant differences, supervisory leadership-support, supervisory leadership-team coordination, and peer leadership-goal emphasis.

The differences in the supervisory leadership-support index resulted from differences in Questions 11 and 12 of this composite index. These questions deal with the approachability of supervisors and their attentiveness to what subordinates have to say. The lower scores on these questions by senior officers seems to result from their separation from the work group itself and the importance of supervisors increasing the member's feelings of the self worth and dignity. Senior enlisted see this as more important than senior officers because of their relative closeness and their experience base. The other significantly different index, peer leadership-goal emphasis, seems to be the result of the circumstances just referred to.



## 6. Junior Officer Versus Senior Officer

The last groups compared by rank also showed no significant difference in the overall group mean scores of 4.11 for junior officers and 4.2 for senior officers. Both scores are in the lower range of participative group management and their closeness appears to be due to the rank position power possessed by both groups. The only differences in index mean scores were in the work group-coordination and promotion satisfaction indices. The scores in the work group-coordination index were 3.87 and 4.23 for junior and senior officers, respectively. This difference appears to result from junior officers' perceptions that work group members do not need to plan together and coordinate individual actions because the work group is not at the participative group level, that they take directions more than participate in planning individual efforts.

The other index showing a significant difference in mean scores was promotion satisfaction. While junior officers are fairly satisfied with the promotion system for officers, they still have to be concerned about making promotions at the right time in their career. Senior officers on the other hand, have made promotions to the point that they are locked in for retirement and don't have to be worried about being passed over for promotion and losing their retirement.



In summary, the Rank subgroups comparisons revealed a great number of statistically significant differences, particularly between the Junior Enlisted subgroup and the Senior Enlisted subgroup. The trend appears to be that with increased seniority comes a shift in attitude of personnel towards a more participative approach to management in some, but not all, aspects.

#### D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY TIME IN SERVICE

Referring to Table V, there were six indices which displayed significant differences when the sample was grouped according to the length of time in the Navy of the respondent. The subgroups were labelled: First Termers (2-7 years); Midgraders (3-13 years); Careerists (14-22 years); and Careerists Plus (23 or more years). Only the indices that showed significant differences between at least two of the subgroups will be discussed.

##### 1. First Termers Versus Midgraders

The first two subgroups compared were First Termers and Midgraders. There were two indices with significantly different means between these subgroups: peer leadership team emphasis and peer leadership goal emphasis. The First Termers' mean scores were 4.03 and 4.01 respectively, with the Midgraders scoring 4.26 and 4.27 respectively. These indices refer to the degree personnel encourage their work



Table V

## Index by Time in Service Subgroup Score

	<u>INDEX</u>	<u>FT</u>	<u>MG</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>CR PLUS</u>
1.	Command Climate Communications Flow	4.09	4.26	4.35	4.12
2.	Command Climate Decision Making	3.99	4.04	4.16	4.39
3.	Command Climate Recognition	4.09	4.16	4.35	4.58
4.	Command Climate Personnel Welfare	4.32	4.26	4.46	4.50
5.	Command Climate Goals and Objectives	4.35	4.42	4.43	4.50
6.	Command Climate Problem Awareness	3.86	3.87	4.07	4.00
7.	Supervisory Leadership Support	4.01	3.96	4.09	4.13
8.	Supervisory leadership Team Coord.	3.87	3.98	4.27	4.33
9.	Supervisory Leadership Team Emphasis	4.31	4.48	4.52	4.50
10.	Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.42	4.56	4.44	4.33
11.	Supervisory leadership Work Facilita.	3.93	4.08	4.28	4.00
12.	Peer Leadership Personal Problems	3.69	3.78	3.84	4.00
13.	Peer Leadership Team Coordination	3.76	3.88	4.06	4.00
14.	Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	4.03	4.26	4.26	4.33
15.	Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.01	4.27	4.24	4.17
16.	Peer Leadership Problem Solving	4.02	4.01	4.15	4.08
17.	Work Group Coordination	3.78	3.96	4.02	4.17
18.	Work Group Decision Making	3.98	4.04	4.09	4.25
19.	Work Group Readiness	3.86	3.84	4.01	4.17
20.	Work Group Order and Discipline	4.10	4.32	4.55	4.75
21.	Goal Integration	4.06	4.12	4.37	4.13
22.	Lower Level Influence	3.50	3.40	3.52	3.08
23.	Leadership and Training	3.97	4.08	4.21	4.00
24.	Progress Satisfaction	4.04	4.06	4.16	4.50
25.	Promotion Satisfaction	4.08	4.06	4.18	4.67
26.	Grand Organization Style	4.00	4.07	4.20	4.23

FT = First Termers, MG = Midgraders,  
CR = Careerists, CR PLUS = Careerists Plus



group peers to work cooperatively and maintain high performance standards. These scores may indicate that the personnel who enjoy a cooperative, high standards work group environment, with members who encourage each other, tend to stay in the Navy. Thus a relatively greater concentration of such people with more time in service tends to drive these indices up.

## 2. First Termers Versus Careerists

As might be expected, the comparison between First Termers and Careerists yielded the greatest number of indices with significantly different scores (9 out of 25). In every index, the mean score of the Careerist was higher. These indices included: command climate communications flow; command climate recognition; supervisory leadership team emphasis; supervisory leadership team coordination; supervisory leadership work facilitation; peer leadership team coordination; work group order and discipline; goal integration and leadership training. The Careerists seemed to attach a much greater importance to command wide two way communication and recognition than did the First Termers. This could be a result of having seen a work group perform well or poorly because of the amount of attention and time devoted to it by the work group supervisor. Careerists rated the need for shared perceptions and expectations between work group team members higher than did First Termers. The



Careerists scored mutual satisfaction of needs between command and individual as more important than did First Termers. This may be because those who do not feel that it is important, that there should be a reciprocal and equitable contribution toward the goals of the command and the goals of individuals in the command, do not make the Navy a career. Work group standards of good order and discipline (i.e. 'the professional military work group') was more emphasized by the Careerists than by the First Termers. It is likely that those who feel little motivation toward espousing Navy standards do not become careerists. Careerists placed greater emphasis on a unit's efforts to provide leadership training than did the First Termers, as might be reasonably expected. One index that was not significantly different, surprisingly, was lower level influence. Careerists and First Termers both scored almost the same. Both groups felt that the lowest level supervisors (primarily E-4) should be influential in decision making between 'to some extent' and 'to a great extent'. This was interpreted to be favoring a consultative management approach to the subject of decision making by lowest level supervisors.

### 3. First Termers Versus Careerists Plus

The type of indices significantly different between First Termers and Careerists Plus subgroup were similar in many instances to the careerist subgroup. Careerists



differed from First Termers on the command climate decision making index, scoring significantly higher on this index than the First Termers. This would tend to indicate that they favored spreading the decision making down to the lower levels. However, the Careerists Plus scored the lower level influence index significantly lower than the First Termers. This may mean that Careerists Plus favor delegating decision making and are receptive to lower level input but only down to a certain level. The work group order and discipline index scores were even further apart for these two subgroups than they were for the First Termers versus Careerists, with the first Termers scoring a mean of 4.09 on this index, and the Careerists Plus at 4.75. This may indicate among other things that personnel who have been in the service a long time (and are presumably senior) regard good order and discipline in work groups as essential. Or it may show that they have been away from work groups for a long time, since work groups do not necessarily place good order and discipline at the head of the list of priorities. Not surprisingly, Careerists Plus rated their satisfaction with progress in the service and satisfaction with promotions significantly higher than did First Termers. One of the usual rewards the service offers is steady progress and steady promotion. It is likely that those personnel who value these rewards highly would end up as Careerist Plus respondents.



#### 4. Midgraders Versus Careerists

Only three indices were significantly different between the Midgraders and the Careerists: supervisory leadership team coordination; work group order and discipline; and goal integration. In each index the Careerists scored higher. Their score on goal integration may reflect a more experience based perspective of the requirement for satisfaction of mutual needs between the command and the individual. The work group order and discipline index went up for the Careerists as it did each time the respondent group's seniority increased.

#### 5. Midgraders Versus Careerists Plus

Between Midgraders and Careerists Plus almost exactly the same set of indices were significantly different as between First Termers and Careerists Plus. The only index that was not significantly different in this comparison that was significantly different between the First Termers and the Careerists Plus was lower level influence. The Midgraders and the Careerists Plus seemed to agree that lower level influence should be in the System Three area. The Midgraders seemed to be less prone to thinking that career progress and promotion satisfaction were as important to effectiveness as Careerists Plus did.



## 6. Careerists Versus Careerists Plus

Between the Careerists and the Careerist Plus subgroups there were significant differences in subgroup mean scores in three indices. Two of the three dealt with career progress and promotion satisfaction. These scores differed in that the Careerists rated these indices high and the Careerists Plus rated the indices very high. The third index was lower level influence. The Careerists associated lower level influence with effectiveness to a much greater extent than did Careerists Plus. This may indicate that the personnel who have been in the service for the longest amount of time simply do not come into contact with junior personnel much, and are not much influenced in their decision by junior personnel. It may be that when these senior people were starting out in the Navy, lower level personnel were not influential in the decision making process and their current perspectives reflect this viewpoint.

### E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY LMET

Referring to Table VI, the indices were analyzed on the basis of whether or not the respondent had previously attended LMET or not. Generally, the mean scores of all indices were higher by one- or two-tenths of a point for LMET attendees over non-attendees. There were, however, only four indices where this difference was significant at the .05 level. These were: command climate recognition; supervisory



Table VI

## Index by LMET and Area

<u>INDEX</u>		<u>ATTEND</u>	<u>NON ATTEND</u>	<u>EAST</u>	<u>WEST</u>
1.	Command Climate Communications Flow	4.22	4.22	4.24	4.16
2.	Command Climate Decision Making	4.09	4.03	4.10	3.98
3.	Command Climate Recognition	4.30	4.07	4.22	4.19
4.	Command Climate Personnel Welfare	4.37	4.32	4.35	4.37
5.	Command Climate Goals and Objectives	4.43	4.36	4.39	4.46
6.	Command Climate Problem Awareness	3.97	3.88	3.94	3.91
7.	Supervisory Leadership Support	4.05	3.99	4.01	4.10
8.	Supervisory Leadership Team Coord.	4.14	3.89	4.05	4.00
9.	Supervisory Leadership Team Emphasis	4.47	3.78	4.43	4.51
10.	Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.48	4.44	4.45	4.54
11.	Supervisory Leadership Work Facilita.	4.15	3.98	4.05	4.22
12.	Peer Leadership Personal Problems	3.83	3.68	3.80	3.65
13.	Peer Leadership Team Coordination	3.98	3.78	3.92	3.82
14.	Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	4.26	4.04	4.17	4.23
15.	Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.23	4.06	4.14	4.25
16.	Peer Leadership Problem Solving	4.11	4.06	4.04	4.18
17.	Work Group Coordination	3.96	3.86	3.93	3.89
18.	Work Group Decision Making	4.09	3.98	4.04	4.07
19.	Work Group Readiness	3.98	3.82	3.93	3.84
20.	Work Group Order and Discipline	4.45	4.13	4.30	4.42
21.	Goal Integration	4.21	4.10	4.17	4.18
22.	Lower Level Influence	3.44	3.50	3.48	3.40
23.	Leadership and Training	4.11	4.02	4.09	4.09
24.	Progress Satisfaction	4.11	4.08	4.12	4.07
25.	Promotion Satisfaction	4.11	4.13	4.16	4.04
26.	Grand Organization Style	4.14	4.03	4.10	4.10

EAST = East Coast

WEST = West Coast



leadership team coordination; peer leadership team emphasis and work group order and discipline. Three of the four indices pertain to work group functioning. All four of the subject areas pertaining to these indices are covered in LMET instruction with emphasis placed on the attendee improving in each area. Since the questionnaire asked the respondent about the extent to which each index was associated with an ideal command, it is not surprising that LMET attendees answered most indices higher, especially those that dealt in work group functioning, one of the prime areas of LMET training. However, based on the small number of indices with significant differences, we conclude that attendance at LMET does not have an effect on the perceptions of management styles as they relate to organizational effectiveness.

#### F. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY AREA

This section is included more for what it says about similarities than what it says about differences. The authors wanted to find out if there were any significant differences in index mean scores on the basis of the respondent having served in the Navy primarily on the East Coast, the West Coast or 'other' (primarily homeported overseas). There weren't enough 'other' respondents to study so that category was dropped. The majority (4:1) of the 290 plus respondents had been homeported primarily on the East Coast during their careers. There were no indices found that



had significant differences. Almost no variance was accounted for by using area as an independent variable. Referring again to Table VI, it was noted that although not statistically significant, East Coast personnel scored higher in career progress and promotion satisfaction than West Coast personnel. The West Coast personnel scored higher in all the indices related to work groups. The differences were never very great, and the authors can only conclude that knowing that an individual has a background on the West Coast or the East Coast is not likely to bring much insight into what he/she thinks an effective organization should look like, or if he/she favors participative-group management or not.

#### G. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA BY TYCOM

##### 1. Surface Versus Aviation

Referring to Table VII, there were no significant differences in any of the indices between the surface respondents and the aviation respondents. Generally, the aviation personnel had higher mean scores on the indices related to the command as a whole, (C1 through C6) and the surface respondents scored higher on the indices related to the work group (C8 through C20). This may be indicative of an attitude espousing greater top management involvement in command wide issues in the aviation community and greater emphasis on the integration of the individual work groups into the total command structure. The aviation respondents



Table VII

## Index by Type of Community

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>SURFACE</u>	<u>AVIATION</u>	<u>OTHER (SUB)</u>
1. Command Climate Communications Flow	4.17	4.22	4.31
2. Command Climate Decision Making	4.00	4.10	4.04
3. Command Climate Recognition	4.19	4.20	4.28
4. Command Climate Personnel Welfare	4.28	4.39	4.31
5. Command Climate Goals and Objectives	4.42	4.39	4.39
6. Command Climate Problem Awareness	4.04	3.90	3.81
7. Supervisory Leadership Support	4.00	4.01	4.13
8. Supervisory Leadership Team Coord.	4.14	3.95	4.22
9. Supervisory leadership Team Emphasis	4.47	4.41	4.42
10. Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.35	4.50	4.53
11. Supervisory Leadership Work Facilita.	4.13	4.03	4.20
12. Peer Leadership Personal Problems	3.81	3.74	3.86
13. Peer Leadership Team Coordination	4.00	3.82	4.00
14. Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	4.18	4.13	4.36
15. Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	4.24	4.08	4.36
16. Peer Leadership Problem Solving	4.08	4.03	4.19
17. Work Group Coordination	4.03	3.85	4.00
18. Work Group Decision Making	4.08	3.98	4.25
19. Work Group Readiness	3.96	3.84	4.11
20. Work Group Order and Discipline	4.34	4.28	4.44
21. Goal Integration	4.20	4.15	4.19
22. Lower Level Influence	3.33	3.51	3.50
23. Leadership and Training	4.11	4.06	4.00
24. Progress Satisfaction	4.04	4.08	4.28
25. Promotion Satisfaction	4.15	4.10	4.17



also scored higher in the index on lower level influence. This may be as a result of dependence on aviation on the technical expertise and judgment of lower ranked technicians in aviation.

## 2. Surface Versus Other (Subsurface)

There were no significant differences in any of the index means. All indices related to the command as a whole were scored higher by the submarine subgroup. The work group related indices were split about evenly between the two subgroups. Lower level influence was scored higher by the submarine respondents, perhaps for the same or similar reasons as the aviation group scored higher than surface.

## 3. Aviation Versus Other (Subsurface)

The submarine respondents scored significantly higher means in two of the work group related indices, peer leadership goal emphasis and work group decision making. The aviation subgroup scored higher (although not statistically significantly higher) on the lower level influence index. This was interpreted as indicating that the submarine work group may be a little more self-directive in nature. Although none of the other indices were significantly different, it was interesting to note that the submarine respondents scored higher means on every work related index except lower level influence. The interpretation may be that submarine respondents associated a stronger work group with a



more organizational effective command more strongly than did the aviation respondents. .

#### H. SUMMARY OF GROUP MEAN DATA

In summary, grouping the sample by rank and time in service revealed the greatest variance between subgroups. Figure 5.9 graphically presents the rank subgroup mean scores for each index using Likert's dimensions. All the rank subgroup mean scores fell between 3 and 5 on the scale, therefore, that portion of the scale was expanded to better show the relationship of the mean scores to each other and to Likert's Systems of Management. As Figure 5.9 shows, there was not much difference between the subgroups. Generally, the more senior personnel were to the right tending toward Likert's System Four (participative group) while the more junior personnel were on the left, tending toward System Three (consultative) management. Also, the lowest scores by all subgroups were recorded in the lower level influence index, revealing mean scores tending towards System Two (benevolent authoritative) style of management.

The other three groupings, type of community, area and LMET, revealed no significant differences between subgroup mean scores.






Figure 5.9 Index by Rank Subgroup Scores  
using Likert's Dimensions



## I. INTERVIEW RESULTS

The interviews were conducted in the latter part of September, 1982, while the authors were on a previously scheduled HRM field trip. There was a total of thirty-four Navy personnel interviewed. Table VIII shows the breakdown of interviewees by rank and area.

Table VIII  
Interviews by Rank and Station

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR STATION JACKSONVILLE</u>	<u>NAVAL STATION CHARLESTON</u>
E-5	3	2
E-6	2	4
E-7	0	6
E-8	0	5
E-9	0	2
O-3	4	0
O-4	0	1
O-5	1	2
<u>O-6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	10	24

The personnel from Naval Air Station, Jacksonville were from an operational helicopter squadron and the personnel from Naval Station Charleston were assigned to the Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center.

The interviews were recorded with each individual's permission. Upon the authors' return to the Naval Postgraduate School, and after the other research data was analyzed, the interview tapes were reviewed and the



information they contained was tabulated. In most cases, specific quotes from several individuals were transcribed that reflected perceptions of from some to many other interviewees. Survey research data was used to generate the questions for the interviews for the purpose of establishing a contextual framework for the survey data. Thus, interview information was gathered to gain a better understanding of why survey respondents answered questions the way they did. Interview data and quotes were identifiable by rank only. A check was run on the distribution of survey responses as a function of rank to see if there were any irregular or bi-modal distributions. While there weren't any bi-modal distributions, there were distributions of responses that were spread over a larger range than other responses when broken down by rank.

The key areas focused on in the interview questions concerned morale and welfare of personnel, work group functioning and supervision, lower level influence, order and discipline, and HRM success.

The following is a discussion of some of the significant perceptions revealed during the interviews and how they may relate to the survey responses analyzed in the previous section.



## 1. Morale and Welfare

The mean of the index dealing with recognition was scored significantly lower for the Junior Enlisted subgroup than for the other three subgroups. Personnel interviewed were asked to respond to the question of how important they felt recognition for hard work is to a unit and why. One E-6 explained his thoughts as, "It's very important, but there is such a thing as overkill. Too much reward becomes nothing at all". The Senior Enlisted subgroup mean score on this index approximated the other subgroup's means. A Chief Petty Officer related his personal views on the importance of recognition, "As a First Class I didn't get all the recognition I deserved. I think it affects my job. In the job I'm doing right now, I could put forth a lot more effort and do a much better job, but I keep looking back and I didn't get the recognition or the programs that I was interested in".

The mean score for the index referring to the degree to which unit top management, the command, should be made aware of problems at the respondent's level was higher for both the two senior subgroups, enlisted and officers. Interviewees were asked to respond to the question of how an effective naval organization acts in this regard. A Lieutenant commented, "It's all contingent upon the magnitude of the problem". A Second Class Petty Officer stated that



"It's not that important, particularly for an E-5 running a work center. He needs to be able to solve problems on his own to develop his leadership skills". A First Class from an aviation squadron remarked, "It depends on the problem. If later on it will embarrass the higher-ups then they should be made aware of it. If it's just a personal problem, handle it at lower levels. Some problems should go all the way up".

## 2. Work Group Functioning and Supervision

One index dealt with the degree that a supervisor should be easy to approach when he should be told that things are not going as well as they should be in a work center. Although the mean scores for this index were between 3.8 and 4.0 for all four of the Rank subgroups, the interview comments were worded more strongly. An E-6 commented, "It's very important. If a guy comes unglued every time, people aren't going to tell him things are all screwed up". Another E-6, from the surface community, stated, "It's important because the supervisor has blind spots. If the worker can't approach the supervisor, then he will probably take things into his own hands and try to correct them, and not handle the problem as well as the supervisor could have".

The mean scores for all subgroups were low for the index dealing with the degree to which work group members should be willing to listen to each other's problems. Personnel were asked for their perceptions. A Lieutenant



stated, "It depends on the problem. It's not necessary to have work group members listen to your personal problems". An aviation E-6 felt that, "You can talk about personal problems better at the level of your own peers. It should never go below the level of your peer group. Chiefs take care of Chiefs and First Class take care of First Class." A surface E-6 added, "Peers aren't always the best avenue for dealing with personal problems. However, they can be very effective for dealing with professional problems."

Three of the subgroups scored a much lower mean than the authors' expected on the survey index asking to what degree work groups should take responsibility for resolving their own disagreements and working out acceptable solutions. The authors thought this index would be scored very high when referenced to the 'ideally effective' Naval organization. One surface E-6 felt that, "Work groups should take responsibility to resolve their own minor problems. The major ones should go vertically. The responsibility for major problem resolution is not on the workers. Your peers can and will give you suggestions, but more often than not, it's the chain of command that will solve the problem."

### 3. Order and Discipline

While all the subgroup scores were above four in the index measuring the degree to which work groups should maintain high standards of order and discipline, the Junior



Enlisted subgroup was the lowest and there was a significant difference between their mean and the means of the other subgroups. Most interviewees felt that high standards of order and discipline were mandatory. However, comments by two E-6's helps to explain the Junior Enlisted perspective. One said, "It's not very important. Being well dressed and maintained on the job is not necessarily to the organization's benefit. The standards of order and discipline should be matched to the job at hand, white collar versus blue collar." Another E-6 comment was that, "It's fairly important...but if rigid, no flexibility, it's more of a detriment. There needs to be flexibility." The score and comments by the Junior Enlisted personnel tend to indicate that they feel order and discipline are not quite as important to the effectiveness of the work group as their superiors.

#### 4. Lower Level Influence

The low scores of all subgroups on the index dealing with lowest level supervisor influence may be attributable to almost all personnel surveyed feeling that there is a limit to the amount of influence that lower ranking supervisory personnel should have. One E-5 stated, "He should have some, but not a heck of a lot; he doesn't always have the big picture." A Lieutenant stated he felt that, "If they have a suggestion or something, it should be considered."



Concerning the influence non-supervisory (E-3 and below) should have in the decision making process in the work group, an E-5 stated that, "He should have input into his supervisor. Everyone needs to feel his opinions are needed." An E-8 surface type explained, "If you take his input, you'll get more from him. You'll show him you are interested in what he says." While all interviewees felt that personnel should be consulted and listened to, most also felt that influence from the lower ranks should be kept in perspective and conditioned on their skill and knowledge level.

#### 5. HRM Success

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the authors were interested in the responses of personnel regarding their perceptions of the success of the Navy's HRM program. Our survey data paralleled that of the Maxwell-Gettys data. Table IX shows the mean scores of the three indices that dealt with HRM program satisfaction.

Table IX

#### HRM Success Scores by Rank Subgroups

<u>SUBGROUP</u>	<u>PAST SUCCESS</u>	<u>PRESENT SUCCESS</u>	<u>FUTURE POTENTIAL</u>
Junior Enlisted	2.96	3.34	3.10
Senior Enlisted	2.62	3.26	3.00
Junior Officer	2.41	2.90	2.80
Senior Officer	2.42	3.10	2.50



As can be seen, perceived HRM program success in the past received the lowest scores. Interviews revealed that there is potential perceived for HRM success in the present and the future. In regards to the past, an E-6 commented, "It doesn't have any power or any control over the situation. It (HRM-presumably the HRAV) just makes recommendations that are generally ignored." As one Senior Chief with 17 and a half years put it, "The command doesn't see the feedback and nothing is done even when the Chiefs and the Officers know there are problems. The CO says everything is OK, so that's it." The criticism was also raised by other personnel, that when feedback was received by the command it was put on a shelf and never used.

When asked to comment on why they thought future HRM success would be lower than present program success, two O-5 Officers both stated that the future potential for HRM program success was probably lower because people were seeing less emphasis placed on the HRM program from top Navy management. This was in regards to both using the program and placing successful people in the HRM program. One O-5 stated that, "HRM is a dead end job. Those in charge are there because they couldn't make it in the fleet, so their credibility is not good. There will not be any teeth in the program until the perception is changed about the job and good officers are in those jobs and receiving good fitness



reports." One E-7 echoed these feelings saying, "They're not going to improve anything unless they try to improve the program and the people in it and most people don't see them doing that." An O-6 HRM officer stated that the Navy is aware of these perceptions and actions are underway to correct the situation. About half of the Junior enlisted subgroup felt that there is potential for future success for the HRM program. One E-6 said, "It's becoming more and more effective all the time". An E-7 stated that, "HRM can be a vital asset if it gets some good backing from the admiral types, like (them) telling the CO's to take the read outs and do something with them". Several Petty Officers mentioned that as more personnel go through LMET and realize where their command is at and what their leadership and management program is, that "they will more readily accept the HRM programs".

To summarize the interviews, there were items which all interviewed personnel agreed were positively associated with organizational effectiveness. These questions dealt with: vertical communications, which nearly everyone agreed was vital; the supervisor having access to the best information no matter at what eschelon that information might be; the supervisor's having to be approachable with bad news by his subordinates; the work group being able to work effectively under pressure, which everyone agreed was



important and most personnel rated as a fundamental requirement for a work group.

As indicated by interviewees, it was generally felt that in an effective organization, non-supervisory personnel should not have much influence in what goes on in the command.

The majority of questions, as might be expected, were not agreed on by all the subgroups either for or against. Questions that evoked a variety of opposing perceptions between interviewees dealt with: command recognition; command level awareness of lower level problems; peers in work groups listening to each other's problems; work groups being able to resolve successfully their own problems; work group order and discipline; promotion and career progress satisfaction; lower level supervisor influence in work group decision making.



## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the analysis and the discussion in the previous chapter on the data obtained from the two hundred ninety-five surveys and the thirty-four interviews, the authors offer the following conclusions.

The overall sample mean score for all respondents was 4.09. This score is almost exactly between Likert's System Three (Consultative) and System Four (Participative Group) management styles. This result tends to indicate that naval personnel, with at least some supervisory or management experience, on the average, associated organizational effectiveness with management styles that are receptive to input from all levels of command in the decision making process. The esteem in which this input is held tended to be a function of the expertise and/or the experience of the giver. Interview data supported the conclusion that once the input had been received from all sources, the decision maker tended to make the decision without further participation from lower level personnel. This style of management is consistent with a consultative management style, Likert's System Three. This conclusion parallels Gettys and Maxwell's conclusion that "...the appropriate management style for



today's officers might be consultative rather than participative" [Ref. 46].

As was mentioned in Chapter V, the rank subgroup comparisons revealed the greatest number of statistically significant differences between subgroups on various indices. More importantly, however, were the significant differences between the subgroups themselves, indicating the differences between subgroups on their perceptions of management styles as they relate to effective naval organizations. There were statistically significant differences in subgroup overall mean scores between the junior enlisted personnel (3.95) and each of the other three groups, senior enlisted personnel (4.34), junior officer personnel (4.11) and senior officer personnel (4.20). There was also a statistically significant difference in the scores of senior enlisted personnel (4.34) and junior officers (4.11). There were no significant differences between subgroup overall mean scores of senior enlisted personnel and senior officers nor between junior and senior officers. These scores reveal the trend that the junior personnel, both enlisted and officer, are less oriented toward a participative group style of management than their rank counterparts.

The time in service (TIS) subgroup comparisons supported the trend developed by the rank subgroups. Personnel with the least time in service were the least oriented toward



participative group with a mean score of 4.00, while the personnel with the most time in service were moving into the participative group range at 4.23. A conclusion drawn from this is that as personnel gain rank and time in service, they tend to move toward a System Four style of management.

We felt that the comparison of whether personnel had attended LMET or not would reveal significant differences between those who had attended and those who had not. It seemed to us that after having attended the LMET course, having been thus exposed to the various leadership and management techniques taught in this course, that the perceptions of personnel would have moved more toward a participative group style of management than those who had not been exposed to those same techniques. However, the data did not reveal significant differences in the overall mean scores between these groups. It might be concluded, then, that it is time in service and not attendance at LMET that moves personnel to associate increased organizational effectiveness with a participative group style of management.

The other two subgroup comparisons, Type of community (TYCOM) and area of assignment (Area) also revealed no statistically significant differences in the subgroup overall mean scores. While there were a few significant differences in certain indices between different subgroups, there was not enough of a difference to show that either TYCOM or Area had



any effect on the perceptions of how these subgroups felt an effective naval organization should operate.

In addition to the conclusions drawn above regarding the subgroup overall mean scores, which relate to systems perceptions, using all indices, the following conclusions are drawn from certain indices, which relate various aspects of management styles with increased organizational effectiveness.

First, in the area of communications. Mean scores for rank subgroups in the communications index followed the trend indicated by TIS. Communications flow scores tended to move more toward System Four management as time in service increased. Based on these scores and comments made by most interviewees, the longer a person has been in the Navy, the more strongly he feels communication flow is related to organizational effectiveness. This indicates that personnel become more aware of giving and receiving information that pertains to them as time in service increases.

Second, the area of decision making also followed the trend of increasing importance to organizational effectiveness as time in service increases. In both indices, command climate-decision making and work group-decision making, senior enlisted and senior officers scored higher than their rank counterparts. With scores ranging from 3.88 for junior enlisted to 4.31 for senior officers, a



reasonable conclusion is that input is important but that full participation was not perceived to be strongly related to increased organizational effectiveness.

Finally, the three program success related questions and the interview data indicated that the HRM program remains burdened with problems regarding its programs and image as perceived by experienced fleet personnel. Chief among the perceived problems were the following:

1. The HRM program has little power or influence to make commands improve once problem areas have been identified. The HRAV data is either not believed or ignored by commanders and put on the shelf with no further action taken.

2. HRM program billets are perceived by fleet personnel as dead end jobs and not career enhancing, particularly for officer personnel. Therefore, the credibility of those filling HRM billets is hurt and they are perceived as not knowing what is going on in the fleet.

3. The HRM program in general, and the HRAV in particular, are "leftovers" from the Zumwalt era, requirements that have to be complied with because they are mandatory. This seems to be a result of a lack of emphasis from the Navy hierarchy.

In summary, we believe that the conclusions reflect a consensus response other than Likert's optimum of "5". The overall mean score of 4.09 is in the System Four range, but it is not even close to a "5". Rather, it tends very closely to System Three, a consultative style of management. Although the perceptions of experienced personnel, both officer and enlisted, tended to move toward "5" as time in service and rank increased, the scores remained in the lower range of



participative group management. These perceptions indicate that experienced fleet personnel relate effectiveness in naval organizations with a more consultative style of management rather than a more participative group style of management.

HRM program ineffectiveness in the past has created perceived problems for the future. The potential at the present was scored higher than the potential for the future, possibly due to the perceived lack of support from the Navy hierarchy. Interviewees felt that the future potential would be better if HRM was made more attractive to personnel as a career field.

While it is recognized that the sample was not a true random sample, it is the authors' belief that it is not biased in any way, for or against participative management or the HRM program. We feel that the data from the sample are accurate and representative of perceptions of experienced naval personnel.

## B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results obtained from the data collected by both survey and interviews and the conclusions drawn from this data, the following recommendations are offered.

(1) Program Success. All of the HRM program success scores are low. Some possible explanations for these low scores were pointed out in the interviews that were



conducted. These explanations, however, cannot be considered conclusive. A further study should be undertaken to investigate further the perceptions of personnel as to why the program success scores are so low. Specifically, why the expected success of the program for the next three years was lower than the present success potential for program success.

(2) Expand the study of enlisted personnel. There were some very significant differences between junior and senior enlisted personnel. As was mentioned previously, in every index, except for two, there was a statistically significant difference. The study should be expanded to investigate these differences further. With an expanded sample, different rank groups or individual ranks could be used to study these differences more closely, what they are and where they exist. Specifically, where does the difference in the mean scores of 3.95 and 4.34 for junior and senior personnel, respectively, really fall out and why? Why are the junior enlisted personnel so much lower overall than the senior enlisted personnel?

(3) Reassess the use of the survey. The responses that were generated in this study were those of experienced naval personnel. The overall mean score of 4.09 should be an indication that experienced naval personnel do not feel that "5", the maximum on the scale, is the ideal environment for



Navy organizations. The results tend to indicate that a different norm may be appropriate. Based on the perceptions of experienced personnel in this study, a participative style of management may not be the ideal style of management for the Navy. Some other style of management, such as consultative management, may be more appropriate for naval commands. While "5" is not perceived to be the best indicator of organizational effectiveness, neither are the fleet norms that commanders currently use to compare their command scores with. Based on the perceptions of experienced fleet personnel, fleet norms seem to be low while "5" seems to be high, as a measure of organizational effectiveness in naval organizations.



# APPENDIX A

## SURVEY

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.  
Then answer each of the following questions  
by placing an X in the numbered box under  
the answer you want to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
	1	2	3	4	5
1. In an effective organization, to what extent is the amount of information shared among work groups adequate to meet job requirements?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command do a good job in "putting out the word" to all hands?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. In an effective organization, to what extent is the chain of command receptive to ideas and suggestions from members of the command?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. In an effective organization, to what extent are decisions made at the level of command where the most adequate information is available?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. In an effective organization, to what extent is information widely shared so that those who make decisions have access to available know-how?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. In an effective organization, when decisions are made, to what extent are the people affected asked for their ideas?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. In an effective organization, to what extent do people who work hard receive recognition from the command?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command have a real interest in the welfare and morale of assigned personnel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command have clear-cut, reasonable goals and objectives that contribute to its mission accomplishment?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. In an effective organization, to what extent are people at higher levels of command made aware of the problems at all levels of command?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. In an effective organization, to what extent are supervisors friendly and easy to approach?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors pay attention to what subordinates say?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. In an effective organization, to what extent are supervisors willing to listen to subordinates' problems?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. In an effective organization when things are not going as well as the supervisor expects, to what extent is it easy for subordinates to tell him/her?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.  
Then answer each of the following questions  
by placing an X in the numbered box under  
the answer you want to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
	1	2	3	4	5
15. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the people in their work group to exchange opinions and ideas?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the people in their work group to work as a team?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the members of their work group to give their best efforts?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors provide the assistance their subordinates need to plan, organize and schedule their work ahead of time?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors offer subordinates ideas to help solve job-related problems?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members listen to each others' problems?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members take responsibility for resolving disagreements among themselves, working out acceptable solutions?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members encourage each other to work as a team?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members encourage each other to give their best effort?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members offer each other ideas for solving job-related problems?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members plan together and coordinate their individual efforts?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. In an effective organization, to what extent are work group members expected to make good decisions and solve problems effectively?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. In an effective organization, to what extent are work groups expected to handle non-routine or emergency situations?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. In an effective organization, to what extent are high standards of order and discipline maintained within the command?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

- |   | To a very little extent  | To a little extent       | To some extent           | To a great extent        | To a very great extent   |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
|   | 1                        | 2                        | 3                        | 4                        | 5                        |
| 29. In an effective organization, to what extent is the command effective in getting you to meet its needs and contribute to its effectiveness? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 30. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command do a good job of meeting the needs of its members?                            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 31. In an effective organization, to what extent do lower-level supervisors influence what goes on in the command?                              | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 32. In an effective organization, to what extent do non-supervisory personnel influence what goes on in the command?                            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 33. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command emphasize training which helps personnel leadership responsibility?           | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Note: These are different answer choices from the previous choices. Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

- |  | 1. Very dissatisfied     | 2. Some dissatisfied     | 3. Neither               | 4. Fairly satisfied      | 5. Very satisfied        |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 34. In an effective organization, how satisfied are individuals with the progress that they have made in the military up to now?         | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 35. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with their perceived chances of getting ahead in the military in the future? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

#### SUCCESS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) IN THE NAVY

Note: These are different answer choices from the previous choices. Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

- |  | To a very little extent  | To a little extent       | To some extent           | To a great extent        | To a very great extent   | Do not know              |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | 1                        | 2                        | 3                        | 4                        | 5                        | 6                        |
| 36. Over the past three years, to what extent, in your opinion, have Human Resource Management Centers/Detachments(HRMC/D's) been successful in assisting commands you've served in to become effective organizations? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 37. In you opinion, to what extent do HRMC/D's currently have the potential to be successful in assisting commands in becoming effective organizations?  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 38. Over the next three years, to what extent do you expect HRMC/D's to be successful in assisting commands in becoming effective organizations?   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |



DEMOGRAPHICS

39. What is your pay grade?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> E-5
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> E-6
- ☐ <sup>3</sup> E-7
- ☐ <sup>4</sup> E-8
- ☐ <sup>5</sup> E-9
- ☐ <sup>6</sup> O-2
- ☐ <sup>7</sup> O-3
- ☐ <sup>8</sup> O-4
- ☐ <sup>9</sup> O-5 or O-6

40. What is your sex?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> Male
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> Female

41. How many years have you served on active duty?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> 2-4 years
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> 5-7 years
- ☐ <sup>3</sup> 8-10 years
- ☐ <sup>4</sup> 11-13 years
- ☐ <sup>5</sup> 14-16 years
- ☐ <sup>6</sup> 17-19 years
- ☐ <sup>7</sup> 20-22 years
- ☐ <sup>8</sup> 23-25 years
- ☐ <sup>9</sup> 26 years or more

42. Mainly, where have you been home-ported?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> U.S. East coast
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> U.S. West coast
- ☐ <sup>3</sup> Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

43. Which type of command have you mainly been assigned to?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> Surface units (ships company)
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> Aviation units
- ☐ <sup>3</sup> Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

44. Have you attended LMET?

- ☐ <sup>1</sup> Yes
- ☐ <sup>2</sup> No



## APPENDIX B

### QUESTION SELECTION CRITERIA

Selection criteria for the questions used was based on one or more of the following criteria:

1. Of the original HRM survey questions, we selected those questions that were from the Michigan survey. We omitted those questions that were navy-peculiar.

2. Of the questions from the Michigan survey that were used in the Gettys, Maxwell study, we selected those that revealed:

a. an extremely low mean score

b. a great difference of means between operational and HRM personnel.

3. At least one question was selected from each index.

The following is a list of the reasons for choosing the questions that we used to make up the survey.

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>REASON</u>
-----------------	---------------

- |    |   |
|----|---|
| 1. | It is an important indicator of the amount of lateral communications flow in the command.   |
| 2. | Important because it indicates the amount of downward communications that should be in the command.                                     |
| 3. | Important as an indicator of the amount of upward communications that should be in the command and the amount of participation allowed. |



4. It is important to know if the decisions are made at the level of command where the most adequate information is available.
5. It is important to have available know-how shared in the decision making process.
6. Low mean score from operational officers and a big spread between the two means. This is an important indicator of the amount of participation in the decision making process.
7. Motivation indicator. Shows the degree of decentralizing effect on the command.
8. Important as an indicator of the amount of concern the command shows in their personnel.
9. It is important that all levels in the command have knowledge and input in the goals and objectives of the command so that all personnel know what the command's mission is.
10. Both mean scores were low. We feel it is important for managers to know if problems exist and what they are.
11. Low mean score from operational personnel and wide spread between mean scores for each group. This is an indicator of how approachable supervisors should be.



12. Indicator of the amount of participation by members that should be allowed in the command.
13. Indicator of the amount of concern supervisors should have for their personnel.
14. Important to know if supervisors should be willing to listen to subordinates when they report that something is not going right.
15. Good indicator of the amount of team coordination and participation that should exist in the group.
16. Action oriented toward teamwork and participative management climate in the command.
17. Important as an indicator of the amount that supervisors encourage team work and participative management.
18. Indicator that supervisors encourage participation in the planning and decision-making process.
19. Low mean scores form both groups. Indicator of the amount of supervisor direction versus subordinate participation.
20. Low mean scores from both groups. Indicator of amount of concern by command and individuals for individual welfare and the morale of the command.
21. Indicator of the importance of a team being able to work out its own problems rather than push them up the chain of command.



- 22. Indicator of the amount of team work that should exist in the command.
- 23. Low score from operational personnel. Indicator of how much the command stands to gain from team effort.
- 24. Indicator of the amount of team work and participative management that should be allowed in the command rather than requiring problems be solved at higher levels.
- 25. Indicator of team work and less supervisor directed planning and decision making.
- 26. Low score from operational personnel may indicate that they expect supervisors, not group members, to make decisions and solve problems.
- 27. Important indicator of the amount of decision making allowed at the work group level.
- 28. Indicator of the amount of order and discipline that should be maintained in an effective command.
- 29-30. Only index of question where operational personnel had higher mean scores on both questions than HRM personnel.
- 31. Very low mean scores indicate that officers don't believe that lower level supervisors should participate in the decision making process.



32. Extremely low mean scores indicates that officers don't think that non-supervisory personnel should have influence in the decision making process. These results certainly are not participative management oriented. Interesting to see how enlisted personnel respond to this question.
33. The higher this score is, the greater potential for members to participate in leadership/decision making.
- 34-35. Indicative of command concern for members' satisfaction with their progress and advancement in the military, and the retainability of its members.
- 36-38. Important to explore the perceptions of the future potential of the HRM program success compared to past and present success.



APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following is a list of the interview questions used:

1. How important is it that the amount of information shared among work groups be adequate to meet job requirements and why?
2. How important is it that the command do a good job of putting out the word to all personnel and why?
3. How important is it that information be shared so that those who make decisions have access to available know-how and why?
4. How important do you feel recognition is to an individual and why?
5. How important is it that the command be interested in the morale and welfare of assigned personnel and why?
6. How important are clean-cut goals and objectives to mission accomplishment and why?
7. How important do you feel it is for higher levels of command to be aware of problems at your level and why?
8. How important do you feel it is that it be easy to tell your supervisor that things are not going as well as he expects and why?



9. How important do you feel it is that a supervisor encourage the people in his work group to work as a team and why?
10. How important is it that a supervisor of a work group encourage his work group members to give their best effort and why?
11. How important is it to you that other members of your work group be willing to listen to your problems and why?
12. How important is it that the work group take the responsibility for resolving its disagreements and working out acceptable solutions and why?
13. How important is it for the work group to perform effectively under pressure or in emergency situations and why?
14. How important do you feel it is that Navy standards of order and discipline be maintained within your work group and why?
15. How satisfied are you with your perceived chances of getting ahead in the Navy and why?
16. Do you feel it is important that non-supervisory personnel have influence in what goes on in the department and why?
17. Do you feel it is important that lower level supervisors have influence on what goes on in your department and why?



18. Over the past three years, how successful do you feel the HRM program has been in assisting commands in becoming effective organizations and why?
19. How successful do you feel the HRM program is at the present time in assisting commands in becoming effective organizations and why?
20. What do you feel the future potential for success is in the HRM program assisting commands in becoming effective organizations and why?
21. Why do you feel that answers would be lower for future potential than for the present success potential of the HRM program?



APPENDIX D  
DATA CODE BOOK

1. The following gives a description of how the questionnaire was coded for use in the SPSS systems packet.

2. One computer card was utilized for entry into the system. The variable, command, was entered after the data file had been constructed. This was possible only because the questionnaires had been kept separate by command and were maintained in the order entered into the data base.

3. The following section provides a breakdown of the coding of the survey. This procedure will permit easy coding for any additional information in the future.

<u>CARDCOL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>VAR. NAME</u>
1	--	RANK
2	--	SEX
3	--	TIS
4	--	AREA
5	--	TYCOM
6	--	LMET
7	--	SPACE
8	1	COMCLCF1
9	2	COMCLCF2
10	3	COMCLCF3
11	4	COMCLDM1
12	5	COMCLDM2
13	6	COMCLDM3
14	7	COMCLMT1
15	8	COMCLHR1
16	9	COMCLHR2
17	10	COMCLHR3
18	11	SUPLDSI1
19	12	SUPLDSI2



<u>CARDCOL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>VAR. NAME</u>
20	13	SUPLDSI3
21	14	SUPLDSI4
22	15	SUPLDTC1
23	16	SUPLDTE1
24	17	SUPLDGE1
25	18	SUPLDWF1
26	19	SUPLDWF2
27	20	PEELDSI1
28	21	PEELDTC1
29	22	PEELDTE1
30	23	PEELOGE1
31	24	PEELDWF1
32	25	WRKPRCI1
33	26	WRKPRCI2
34	27	WRKPRRI1
35	28	WRKPRDI1
36	29	ERMGOAL1
37	30	ERMGOAL2
38	31	ERMLLI1
39	32	ERMLLI2
40	33	ERMTRA1
41	34	ERMSAT1
42	35	ERMSAT2
43	36	PGMSAT1
44	37	PGMSAT2
45	38	PGMSAT3
46	--	SPACE
47	--	PERSON
48	--	PERSON
49	--	PERSON
50	--	SPACE
51	--	COMMAND

4. The following section provides the coding and method of computation for the indices used for comparison in the study. This information does not represent data placed on cards, but rather a manipulation of section above.



<u>VAR. NAME</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>VAR. LABEL</u>	<u>COMPUTATION</u>
C1	1-3	COMMAND CLIMATE- COMMUNICATIONS FLOW	COMCLCF1+COMCLCF2+ COMCLCF3/3
C2	4-6	COMMAND CLIMATE- DECISION MAKING	COMCLDM1+COMCLDM2+ COMCLDM3/3
C3	7	COMMAND CLIMATE- RECOGNITION	COMCLM11
C4	8	COMMAND CLIMATE- PERSONNEL WELFARE	COMCLHR1
C5	9	COMMAND CLIMATE- GOALS & OBJECTIVES	COMCLHR2
C6	10	COMMAND CLIMATE- PROBLEM AWARENESS	COMCLHR3
C7	11-14	SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP- SUPPORT	SUPLDSI1+SUPLDSI2+ SUPLDSI3+SUPLDSI4/4
C8	15	SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP- TEAM COORDINATION	SUPLDTC1
C9	16	SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP- TEAM EMPHASIS	SUPLDTE1
C10	17	SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP- GOAL EMPHASIS	SUPLDGE1
C11	18-19	SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP- WORK FACILITATION	SUPLDWF1+SUPLDWF2/2
C12	20	PEER LEADERSHIP PERSONAL PROBLEMS	PEELDSI1
C13	21	PEER LEADERSHIP TEAM COORDINATION	PEELDTC2
C14	22	PEER LEADERSHIP TEAM EMPHASIS	PEELDTE1
C15	23	PEER LEADERSHIP GOAL EMPHASIS	PEELDGE1
C16	24	PEER LEADERSHIP PROBLEM SOLVING	PEELDWF1



<u>VAR. NAME</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>VAR. LABEL</u>	<u>COMPUTATION</u>
C17	25	WORK GROUP COORDINATION	WRKPRC11
C18	26	WORK GROUP DECISION MAKING	WRKPRC11
C19	27	WORK GROUP READINESS	WRKPRR11
C20	28	WORK GROUP ORDER & DISCIPLINE	WRKPRD11
C21	29-30	GOAL INTEGRATION	ERMGOAL1+ERMGOAL2/2
C22	31-32	LOWER LEVEL INFLUENCE	ERMLLI1+ERMLLI2/2
C23	33	LEADERSHIP TRAINING	ERMTRA1
C24	34	PROGRESS SATISFACTION	ERMSAT1
C25	35	PROMOTION SATISFACTION	ERMSAT2
C26		GRAND ORGANIZATION STYLE	C1+C2+C3+C4+C5+C6+C7+ C8+C9+C10+C11+C12+ C13+C14+C15+C16+C17+ C18+C19+C20+C21+C22+ C23+C24+C25/25



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